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The Baynespruit, a stream running through the city of Pietermaritzburg in KwaZulu-Natal, is 
blighted by chronic, severe solid and liquid waste pollution in the form of sewage, industrial 
effluent and household garbage. It drains a large residential area, then flows through the 
city's main industrial area before reaching a low-income neighbourhood whose residents are 
unable to use the water for recreation and small-scale agricultural irrigation due to its 
polluted state. Both the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) and the local 
Msunduzi Municipality have been largely unsuccessful in their attempts to use regulatory 
means to address the situation over the past two decades. Bodies such as the Msunduzi 
Catchment Management Forum (MCMF) have little representation from industry and have 
been equally unable to initiate effective action. One possible way to work toward reducing 
pollution problems is to involve all stakeholders in a co-operative participatory process; a key 
element is therefore the use of incentives and the removal of barriers to participation. 
 
The aim of this research was to analyse past initiatives that have tried to address pollution in 
the Baynespruit, gain an understanding of stakeholders’ views of the problems and their 
relative importance, and identify economic, situational, developmental and socio-cultural 
barriers and incentives to participation in a multi-stakeholder process. To accomplish this, 
the research methodology included a number of different qualitative techniques as part of a 
case study approach. The main research tool used was a semi-structured interview 
conducted with individual stakeholders from government agencies and parastatals, industry, 
local residents and members of NGOs; the use of historical print media coverage and both 
participant and direct observation complemented the interview data. 
 
Though the details of past initiatives were difficult to trace due to the loss of institutional 
memory at both the agency and NGO level, they appear to have suffered from a lack of 
communication, accountability and inclusiveness among key stakeholders. Most of the 
stakeholders interviewed have an understanding of the various pollution problems affecting 
the Baynespruit and the consequent threat to human health, and there was general 
agreement that a mix of education, monitoring and enforcement was necessary to solve 
these problems. There was also broad support for a multi-stakeholder process, with all 
subjects stressing the need for action, not just discussion, as well as real engagement on the 
part of their fellow stakeholders. For local residents, building a network of contacts and 
partnerships could address many of the economic, developmental and socio-cultural barriers 
they face, and strengthen their effectiveness in fostering participation among other 




such as a lack of consequences for polluting, and the feeling that it was ‘not their problem’, 
powerful economic and situational incentives, such as pressure from corporate customers 
and the public, remain largely unexploited. A lack of resources in the form of time, staff and 
equipment, as well as unsuccessful past experiences which have created a reluctance to 
prosecute or release information, were the major impediments preventing staff at regulatory 
agencies and parastatals from motivating other stakeholders to participate, though they were 
aware of the potential for increase effectiveness offered by participatory processes. It is 
hoped that by recommending ways to maximise incentives and reduce barriers, this 
research will assist the recently-established Baynespruit Conservancy, which is involving all 
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“The Bayne’s Spruit is all but dead. Industrial effluent … and human sewage 
regularly discharged into the stream  … has killed off nearly all the life and 
oxygen there is. Experts have described the small tributary of the Umsunduzi 
River as ‘an open sewer’.”  
(Quinlan, 1993: 1) 
 
In the 15 years since these words were written, not much has changed for the Baynespruit, a 
stream running through the city of Pietermaritzburg in South Africa. The capital of KwaZulu-
Natal province, Pietermaritzburg, shown in Figure 1.1, is nestled among the rolling hills of 
the Natal Midlands, an area known for its beautiful scenery. The city is part of the larger 
Msunduzi Municipality, which includes the rural, tribal authority, and former township areas 
that surround the urban and suburban core. The Municipality is named for the uMsunduzi 
river, which flows east through Pietermaritzburg on its way to the Indian Ocean. Water 
quality in the river is acceptable or better until it reaches the urban periphery, but becomes 
seriously degraded as it flows through the city (Umgeni Water, n.d). As it continues to the 
eastern edge of Pietermaritzburg, the river is joined by the Baynespruit, a tributary that 
surely contributes to the poor state of the uMsunduzi. According to the results of weekly 
monitoring by Umgeni Water, the regional bulk water supplier, the Baynespruit is the most 
polluted stream in the uMsunduzi Catchment. The factors contributing to its appalling state 
are far from unique, though, which makes it a worthy case study for stakeholders 
participation in pollution reduction. 
 
The Baynespruit originates in the Northdale and Raisethorpe neighbourhoods, flowing 
through the Willowton Industrial Area (WIA) and past small informal settlements and the 
Eastwood and Sobantu neighbourhoods before reaching its confluence with the uMsunduzi 
river. It is blighted by chronic, severe solid and liquid waste pollution, and its banks are 
clogged with invasive alien plants. Raw sewage flows into the stream as a result of sewer 
surcharges, where due to heavy rain events or blockages the sewer pipes which run along 
the stream overflow into the water course through breaks or manhole covers; this is 
exacerbated by illegal rainwater run-off connections to the sewers from housing upstream. 
Informal settlements, in which residents have no toilet facilities and often use the stream 
banks, also contribute to faecal pollution. Since 1990, E. coli levels in the Baynespruit have 
been above 5 000 counts per 100 ml more than 70% of the time, and have been recorded 




the maximum safe level of E. coli for swimming is a mere 130 counts per 100 ml (DWAF, 
1996). Discharges of industrial effluent have resulted in fish kills, as well as blockages in the 
irrigation systems that some farmers in Sobantu use to water their vegetable gardens 
(Umgeni Water, 2002). Consequently, the stream also has very poor ecosystem health 
ratings, with a median South African Scoring System (SASS) score below 3, considered 
‘severely impacted’ (Terry, 2008). In the most visible sign of pollution, household garbage 
tossed onto the floodplain or directly into the water from nearby residences chokes the 
Baynespruit, especially where it flows under bridges near the community of Sobantu.  
 
 




1.1.1 Regulatory Framework 
Though this study focuses on non-regulatory participatory processes, it is nonetheless 
important to understand the national and local regulatory framework with respect to water 
quality, as it is within this environment that stakeholders act and interact. The national 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) is the main policy coordination and 
regulatory body, charged with implementing and administering the National Water Act 
(NWA) of 1998; the DWAF thus has responsibility for both water quantity and quality, 




1997, the DWAF also oversees the provision of drinking water and sanitation by 
municipalities and their designated water services providers; the DWAF’s regulations cover, 
inter alia, the control of ‘objectionable substances’ entering storm water drains or 
watercourses, and the prevention of storm water from entering sewer systems (DWAF, 
2002). At the local level, Msunduzi Municipality (of which the City of Pietermaritzburg is a 
part) is the main agency with jurisdiction over water-related powers and functions, including 
responsibility for sewer networks and industrial effluent bylaws. Umgeni Water, the regional 
water services provider, is a parastatal which conducts regular water quality testing and 
supports the municipality with regard to pollution monitoring and enforcement. While this 
framework appears to provide comprehensive regulation of water quality, in practice, both 
the DWAF’s and the municipality’s implementation and enforcement activities have been 
limited by a lack of institutional capacity (Hamann & O’Riordan, 2000; Pole, 2002). This is 
exacerbated by poor coordination and clarification of roles among staff at the DWAF, the 
municipality and Umgeni Water, as well as confusion surrounding the powers of 
municipalities to assume responsibility for enforcement and prosecution powers set forth by 
the national legislation (Pole, 2002). 
 
However, the existing decision-making structure appears set to change. Catchment 
Management Agencies (CMAs), consisting of representatives from the various interested 
parties within watershed regions, are due to be established under the NWA to make 
decisions with regard to catchment-level water resource management (DWAF, 2007). If 
CMAs are constituted as currently envisaged, local actors will have a publicly-accessible and 
open forum, endowed with decision-making power and tasked with involving local 
communities, at which to present their issues and information – a sharp contrast to the 
current situation, where communication generally takes place directly between the interested 
party and DWAF. As the existing plan calls for the establishment of only 19 CMAs covering 
the entire country, local stakeholders will have to play a critical role in informing the 
representatives at each regional-scale CMA. The balance of power is thus likely to shift, as 
DWAF’s role progresses toward one of providing structures and information, while decision-
making increasingly becomes the responsibility of the CMA members themselves. 
 
1.1.2 Stakeholders 
It is within this regulatory context that stakeholders along the Baynespruit operate. As has 
been discussed, Msunduzi Municipality and Umgeni Water play important roles with regard 
to water pollution monitoring and enforcement. Within civil society, the most active non-
government organization (NGO) working on water quality issues is the Duzi-uMngeni 




watercourses. Along the lower reaches of the Baynespruit, the main stakeholders include: 
the industries located in the WIA, particularly the edible oil producers and others who 
discharge effluent into sewers and storm drains along the river; local residents, both in 
Sobantu and in nearby formal and informal settlements, such as Cinderella A, who both 
contribute to and suffer from the litter and sewage pollution problems; and farmers in the 
Sikhuthele Community Club (formerly Co-op 1) and other Sobantu residents who require 
water from the Baynespruit for irrigation purposes. 
 
1.2 Need for the Study 
Pollution, as shown in Figure 1.1, has been a serious problem in the Baynespruit for at least 
two decades. Efforts such as the community-oriented Baynespruit Clean-up Campaign in 
2001 were declared successful because “the participants now appreciate the importance of 
a clean environment and the need to rehabilitate the Baynespruit” (Umgeni Water, 2002: 42), 
but conditions in the stream remain dire. A number of factories have repeatedly been 
discovered in violation of established discharge regulations, but recourse to the legal 
provisions of the criminal justice system has been largely unsuccessful (Pole, 2002). In 1997, 
a Catchment Management Forum was established for the uMsunduzi river, of which the 
Baynespruit is a tributary, and its watershed. Representatives from the Sobantu 
Environmental and Agricultural Forum (SEAF), the DUCT, and regulatory agencies and 
parastatals, including DWAF, Msunduzi Municipality and Umgeni Water are all represented, 
though there has not been regular participation from industry; the state of the Baynespruit 
has been discussed at length by the Msunduzi Catchment Management Forum (MCMF), but 
as yet the actions taken have not proven effective (MCMF, 2008). Despite these various fora 
and initiatives, there has been no apparent improvement in the condition of the Baynespruit. 
 
This research will thus attempt to uncover the reasons why past efforts have not led to 
lasting change, and what factors may allow and encourage stakeholders to bring about 
significant pollution reduction in the future. While there is a wealth of information to be found 
on factors motivating citizen participation, there has not been a significant volume of 
research generated on regulatory agency and industry participation, or on multi-stakeholder 
processes in particular; it is hoped that this study will contribute to the latter bodies of work. 
With respect to local water resources, governance and pollution, the situation in 
Pietermaritzburg has been the subject of two recent Masters’ theses. The research 
conducted by Pole (2002) into the failure of the application of the ‘polluter pays principle’ to 
industries polluting the Baynespruit was particularly informative. In fact, a number of citizens 
expressed the view that as the judicial process has indeed been unsuccessful in reducing 






Figure 1.2: A stormwater outfall along the Baynespruit, showing pollution from both solid 
and liquid waste 
 
Source: J. Butler, DUCT 
 
In early 2008, members of the DUCT discussed the possibility of establishing a Baynespruit 
Conservancy, which would involve all interested parties in an effort to address the serious 
pollution problems in the stream. Identifying the possible non-regulatory incentives and 
barriers to participation should help ensure that this new initiative has the opportunity to 
succeed where similar projects have failed in the past. Moreover, once the CMA structure is 
in place regionally, organisations such as the Conservancy will be instrumental in ensuring 
that local water-related information and issues are brought to the attention of this forum. As a 
working example of integrated environmental management, the Conservancy should be well-
placed to capitalise on the organisational capacity of resources such as the Pietermaritzburg 
campus of the University of KwaZulu-Natal and the headquarters of Umgeni Water to 
support its initiatives. The vision guiding the research is therefore that of a Baynespruit 
Conservancy in which all stakeholders work together effectively to address and reduce the 
serious solid and liquid pollution problems in the stream. 
 
1.3 Statement of the Problem 
This research stems from the practical problems outlined in the preceding sections. The 
current socio-ecological system in which all Baynespruit stakeholders contribute to its 
pollution, whether through action or benign neglect, must somehow be altered in order to 
effect change. Previous targeted initiatives and state prosecution, operating within the 




possible way to work toward reducing the pollution problems is to involve all stakeholders in 
a more co-operative participatory process; a key element will therefore be the use of 
incentives and the removal or transcending of barriers to participation. To accomplish this, 
the perspectives of each stakeholder group (citizens and NGOs, industries, and regulatory 
agencies and parastatals) must first be understood, with respect to both the pollution 
problems and their effects. The various economic, situational, developmental and socio-
cultural factors that encourage and discourage participation on the part of each stakeholder 
group must then be identified in order to foster a multi-stakeholder process in which all 
participants are empowered to bring about the changes necessary to reduce pollution.  
 
1.4 Objective of the Research 
The overall objective of the research was to determine how non-regulatory barriers and 
incentives can influence stakeholder participation in reducing water pollution in 
Pietermaritzburg’s Baynespruit. To achieve this, the specific objectives were to: 
a) analyse past initiatives that have tried to address pollution in the Baynespruit, including 
the identification of lead stakeholder(s), goals, difficulties encountered and likely reasons 
for lack of success; 
b) understand stakeholders’ views of the problem, by identifying the main stakeholders 
among industry, local residents, NGOs, and regulatory agencies and parastatals, 
determining what they see as the major issues and their effects, and identifying the 
perceived importance of the problems; and 
c) identify barriers and incentives to participation, including economic, situational, 
developmental and socio-cultural factors. 
 
 
1.5 Clarification of Concepts 
 
Participation 
Generally defined as ‘the act or fact of taking part’, participation in the context of this study 
implies something more active than passive, a process of co-operation and learning among 
individuals in a group (Rahnema, 1992). Participation should forge relationships and trust 
among participants, and build their capacity in terms of knowledge and skills to empower 
them to make decisions and create change (Beierle & Cayford, 2002). 
 
Stakeholder 
A stakeholder can be defined as any person or group with an interest or share in something. 
With respect to environmental issues, stakeholders may include national and local 




and other citizens (Mullen & Allison, 1999); in this study three groups are recognised: 
residents and NGOs, industries, and regulatory agencies and parastatals. Multi-stakeholder 
processes involve bringing together carefully-selected representatives from each interested 
and affected group (Kilvington, 1998) in order to develop shared understandings, 
collaboratively resolve conflict and make better decisions. 
 
Non-regulatory 
Regulatory methods to control pollution generally involve a command and control approach, 
in which authorities set emissions or technological standards to which polluters must adhere. 
Non-regulatory approaches include tax incentives, tradable permits, information disclosure, 
media campaigns targeting consumers, and voluntary cooperation (Afsah et al., 1997; 
Khanna, 2001; Wheeler, 1999). As economic incentives and tradable permits nonetheless 




A barrier is something that blocks or impedes action. For the purposes of this study, a barrier 
is something that discourages or prevents participation, and various researchers have 
grouped barriers (or disincentives) to participation into different categories (see, for example 
Gaventa & Valderrama, 1999; Prestby et al., 1990). In the context of this study, barriers are 
categorised as economic, situational, developmental or socio-cultural in nature. 
 
Incentive 
An incentive is something that motivates action. For the purposes of this study, an incentive 
is something that encourages or facilitates participation; various researchers have grouped 
incentives (or benefits) to participation into different categories (see, for example Afsah et al., 
1997; Prestby et al., 1990; Widmer, 1989). To maintain consistency, incentives, like barriers, 
are classified as economic, situational, developmental or socio-cultural in this study. 
 
1.6 Research Methodology 
Just prior to its confluence with the larger uMsunduzi river, the Baynespruit flows past the 
community of Sobantu, an established, relatively homogenous Zulu neighbourhood with a 
population of some 10 000 people. Though most residents live in formal houses with 
electricity, municipal refuse collection, water and sanitation, unemployment remains a 
problem. Many residents work at the two dozen factories in the nearby WIA; owners and 
management at these companies tend to be of European or Indian heritage, as do regulatory 




and contamination of the municipal sewer system by industrial effluent has been an ongoing 
problem, as has faecal pollution caused by stormwater infiltration into ageing sewers, illegal 
connections, blockages and informal settlement areas with inadequate sanitation. The main 
NGO in the region advocating for environmentally-healthy local watercourses is the DUCT, 
which has established partnerships to clean up waste, remove alien invasive species, plant 
trees, and implement education and awareness campaigns. All of these stakeholders were 
represented in the semi-structured interviews conducted following a purposive sampling 
protocol, in which members of each stakeholder group were specifically targeted. 
 
This study took the form of a quasi-participatory case study. The research techniques 
employed included semi-structured interviews, documentation, participant observation and 
direct observation. The main measuring instrument was an interview consisting primarily of 
open-ended questions, conducted anonymously. Data analysis mainly involved the creation 
of a detailed descriptive narrative. Direct interpretation of the various sources of evidence 
and the recognition of patterns in the data were used to achieve an understanding of the 
potential for various stakeholders to become fully involved in meaningful participation. The 
raw data were summarised to identify common elements within and among stakeholder 
groups, and barriers and incentives to participation were also categorised as economic, 
situational, developmental or socio-cultural. 
 
1.7 Delimitations and Limitations 
This study focuses on the stakeholders living, working and/or recreating along the lower 
reaches of a single tributary of the uMsunduzi river, the Baynespruit. In addition to regulatory 
agencies and NGOs concerned with the entire catchment, two particular stakeholder groups 
along the lower reaches of the stream (where pollution is most pronounced) were targeted: 
companies in the WIA discharging stormwater to the stream, and residents living in the 
community of Sobantu along its banks. 
 
Given that the Sobantu neighbourhood is an established community with an 80-year history, 
serviced with water, sewer, electricity and tarmac roads, it is not possible to extrapolate the 
data gathered there to all other communities, particularly informal settlements, elsewhere in 
the catchment. 
 
While this research formed part of a larger initiative to establish a functioning Baynespruit 
Conservancy to address the serious solid and liquid pollution in the stream, it focussed 
solely on the identification of barriers and incentives to stakeholder participation, without 




1.8 Sequence of Chapters 
This dissertation consists of five chapters, which are summarised here. Chapter 1 begins by 
outlining the issues affecting the Baynespruit and the various stakeholders who contribute to 
and are affected by the river’s pollution problems. It goes on to describe how this study 
contributes to finding solutions, and provides a vision of the ideal outcome. The research 
problem and objectives are then set out. In the next section, some of the key concepts are 
explained in relation to this study. This is followed by a brief description of the research 
methodology, as well as the boundaries and shortcomings of the research. 
 
The research process necessarily begins with a review of the available literature pertinent to 
the subject under study, and this is discussed in Chapter 2. The chapter begins with a review 
of the general issues surrounding water pollution and approaches to addressing the problem. 
It then continues with a discussion of the nature of participation and stakeholders, and the 
possible outcomes of multi-stakeholder participatory processes.  Barriers to participation 
faced by each stakeholder group, as well as their relative importance, are then explored, and 
this is followed by a similar discussion with regard to incentives. 
  
The research design and methodology followed in carrying out this study is described in 
Chapter 3. By way of introduction to the research setting, the chapter begins with a portrayal 
of the characteristics of the area and the stakeholders involved, followed by a description of 
the techniques used to address the research objectives. The next section provides an 
explanation of the research methodology, including the measuring instrument used. The 
procedures that were followed to carry out the research are then set out, followed by an 
account of how the data were interpreted and analysed. Finally, issues of data validity and 
reliability are addressed. 
 
Arguably the most important part of the dissertation, the presentation and discussion of 
results, is the subject of Chapter 4. This first section discusses the history of pollution in the 
Baynespruit and analyses the past initiatives which have attempted to address it. Next, 
stakeholders’ views of the problem are discussed by group (local residents and NGOs, 
industries, and regulatory agencies and parastatals). This is followed by an examination of 
the findings with respect to barriers to participation on the part of each group, while a 
similarly-structured discussion of incentives completes the chapter. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the conclusions drawn from the research and makes a number of 
recommendations. The first section summarises the key findings discussed in Chapter 4 and 




dissertation has answered the original research questions and draws conclusions about the 
importance of the various categories of barriers and incentives to each stakeholder group. 
The final section makes recommendations for each stakeholder group with regard to 
addressing pollution in the Baynespruit, suggests improvements to the research 
methodology, and sets out possible future research into this topic. 
 
1.9 Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of the pollution affecting the Baynespruit, the 
stakeholders who both contribute to and are affected by it, and the regulatory environment in 
which they operate. It went on to describe how this study proposed to identify non-regulatory 
barriers and incentives to these same stakeholders’ participation in reducing water pollution 
in the stream. To achieve this aim, the first step was to delve into the relevant literature; 
Chapter 2 summarises the information gleaned from a diversity of sources with regard to the 
nature of participation itself, as well as the distinct barriers and incentives experienced by the 

















Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Water pollution is not a problem unique to Pietermaritzburg’s Baynespruit, and this chapter 
begins by exploring the causes of water pollution and the various factors that contribute to its 
persistence. It goes on to examine some possible approaches to addressing pollution 
problems. Next, it explores the nature of participation and multi-stakeholder processes, 
which underpin this study. Finally, the relevant literature on barriers and incentives to 
stakeholder participation is presented with respect to the three stakeholder groups (local 
residents and NGOs, industries, and regulatory agencies and parastatals) and four 
categories of barriers and incentives (economic, situational, developmental and socio-
cultural) used in this study. 
 
2.2 Water Pollution 
The sources of water pollution are many, including “untreated domestic sewage, 
uncontrolled industrial discharges, deforestation and poor agricultural practices that result in 
soil erosion and leaching of nutrients and pesticides” (Kraemer et al., 2001: 1). Considering 
how important clean water is to human survival, it seems counter-intuitive that anthropogenic 
pollution of the planet’s water resources is so widespread. However, in his influential piece 
The Tragedy of the Commons, Hardin (1968) recognised pollution as among those 
phenomena in which logical decision-making by each of many resource users leads to the 
overuse and devastation of common resources for all users. Becker and Ostrom (1995) 
define common resources as those from which it is not feasible to prevent use by any 
‘potential beneficiary’, and from which the amount used by one beneficiary is no longer 
available to others. The problem with such resources is that individually, resource users 
(including those who use a given resource for disposal of waste) have no incentive to limit 
their use and are in fact likely to benefit, at least in the short-term, from undermining 
sustainability (Berkes, 2004; Dietz et al., 2002). Hence the prediction that in the future, 
Africa’s water resources will come under increasing threat from “untreated sewage, 
eutrophication, pollution from oil and gas fields and industrial effluents mainly generated by 
small-scale industries” (Kraemer et al., 2001: 4). 
 
However, Rowe (2008: 142) points out “that the problem is not common ownership per se 
but rather open access – that is, commons in which there are no social structures or formal 
rules to govern access and use”. Especially in the case of water pollution, because it flows 
downstream, exploitation for individual or corporate gain is inevitable within such open-




few or none of the costs – will accrue (Ghai & Vivian, 1992; Vivian, 1992). Rowe (2008) thus 
proposes a management system which functions more like a trust, in which decisions are 
made based on long-term sustainability and the sharing of benefits among stakeholders. 
This is essentially the approach taken by South Africa and other countries that have 
developed legislation intended to safeguard water resources for all citizens. In practise, 
however, the strategy has not succeeded. Kraemer et al. (2001) blame the failure of the 
command and control approach, particularly in developing countries, on a lack of 
government resources to carry out effective monitoring and enforcement, exacerbated by 
factors such as corruption and the trumping of environmental concerns by economic growth. 
In fact, the World Bank found a positive linear relationship between increasing per capita 
income and declining intensity of organic water pollution in its study of a dozen developed 
and developing countries (Wheeler, 1999), indicating that the least-developed countries 
suffer from the worst pollution. 
 
Given that developing countries are unlikely to be able to devote more resources to policing 
water pollution in the short-term, they have been looking instead to new methods that take 
advantage of existing resources and leverage points. In such systems, “regulation is 
information intensive and transparent [and] environmental agencies … become more like 
mediators and less like dictators. Community representatives take their place at the 
negotiating table along with regulators and factory managers. Market agents make their 
presence felt through the decisions of consumers, bankers, and stockholders” (Wheeler, 
1999: 3). However, the management of water resources is not only about the control of point 
sources of pollution, but includes any manipulation that affects water quantity or quality 
(Mollinga, 2008). The need to take into account all water resources, along with 
environmental necessities and human pressures from the full range of stakeholders, has 
thus led to the development of Integrated Water Resources Management (Molle et al., 2008).  
 
When it comes to sustainable management of such complex systems, it is important that 
system boundaries be clearly delineated, that all stakeholders are involved in decision-
making, and that monitoring be reinforced by penalties (Becker & Ostrom, 1995). Kraemer et 
al. (2001) point to collaborative partnerships among diverse stakeholders, and the need for 
all stakeholders to be well-informed, as critical to successful stewardship. All this is best 
accomplished at a local level, where it is possible for “social mechanisms … such as 
communication, trust, and the ability to make binding agreements” to control fundamental 
self-interest (Dietz et al., 2002: 5). Locally-based management bodies are also better 
positioned to learn from and react to the systems for which they are responsible (Berkes, 




arrangement, natural resource management is thus best conducted by local stakeholders 
(Egger & Majeres, 1992). The following sections outline two of the many options such 
stakeholders may use to address water pollution. 
 
2.2.1 Voluntary Environmental Agreements 
One of the most promising potential outcomes of stakeholder participation in non-regulatory 
processes addressing pollution is the Voluntary Environmental Agreement (VEA). Though 
some experts limit their definition of VEAs to those made between regulators and firms, or 
commitments made unilaterally by firms (Khanna, 2001), others include VEAs made 
between firms and NGOs, between regulators and NGOs, and among multiple stakeholders 
(Karamanos, 2001). Acutt (2003) sees VEAs as part of the ‘corporate responsibility’ 
approach, in contrast to ‘corporate accountability’, which is accomplished by regulatory 
means. Khanna (2001) classifies these non-mandatory agreements as: 
• public voluntary programmes, in which companies agree to meet government-set 
environmental performance targets in exchange for benefits such as recognition, 
technical assistance and tax concessions; 
• bilateral initiatives, in which targets are negotiated between the regulatory agency and a 
company or an industry, often in lieu of tighter legislation and enforcement; or 
• unilateral initiatives, in which companies draw up their own targets or agree to meet 
targets developed by an industry group or a certifying body. 
However, Acutt (2003) replaces the second category with agreements negotiated among two 
or more parties. An example of public voluntary programmes are those of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, such as Green Lights, in which companies pledge to 
reduce pollution by set amounts or to certain levels; examples of unilateral initiatives include 
ISO 14000 or Forest Stewardship Council certification, while McDonald’s restaurants’ joint 
work with the Environmental Defense Fund to reduce waste could be considered a bilateral 
initiative (Acutt, 2003; Lober, 1998).  
 
One of the caveats of such agreements is that without any penalties for non-compliance, 
firms may use them to project a positive image while masking problems or a lack of 
commitment to fundamental change (Acutt, 2003; Khanna, 2001). However, despite being 
non-binding, VEAs are generally backed by regulatory threats and are becoming 
increasingly common in places such as Europe, Japan and North America (Karamanos, 
2001). In South Africa, certain types of VEAs are provided for under the National 
Environmental Management Act (NEMA), and have been pioneered by industries in the 
public eye, such as mining and chemical companies (Hamann & Acutt, 2003). Acutt (2003) 




a result of the post-apartheid focus on participatory democracy, but also due to the limited 
resources of regulatory agencies. This latter issue can become a problem in the absence of 
adequate monitoring and enforcement (and participation by civil society): industries 
themselves can end up steering the process, and poor performers may dodge accountability 
(Hamann & Acutt, 2003). On the other hand, some such agreements with civil society actors 
actually commit companies to aim for even higher standards than those set by regulatory 
agencies. One example is that of a gasification facility planned for the city of Hamilton in the 
province of Ontario, Canada where the proponents have agreed to strive for mercury and 
particulate emission limits put forth by a citizens’ group which are tighter than those required 
by their operating certificates (Environment Hamilton, 2008).  In South Africa, some of the 
first VEAs were negotiated with petroleum refineries in Durban South, where Environmental 
Cooperation Agreements were made between government agencies, led by the Department 
of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), and companies; unfortunately penalties and 
incentives were unclear, and civil society was marginalised, creating a breakdown of trust 
with residents and other ‘third party’ stakeholders (Acutt, 2003). More successful was a 
Good Neighbour Agreement negotiated directly between Engen and representatives from 
the local community, with support from regulatory agencies in the form of inclusion of the 
agreed conditions into Engen’s refinery permit (Acutt, 2003). As we shall see in the following 
section, compliance with such agreements may be monitored by citizens themselves. 
 
2.2.2 Community Environmental Monitoring 
Community Environmental Monitoring (CEM) is variously known as ‘community-based 
monitoring’, ‘volunteer ecological monitoring’ and, particularly in North America, ‘citizen 
science’.  It generally involves people who are not professional scientists documenting the 
natural world and/or human effects on the environment by recording information, for example 
about plants and animals, water quality, or air pollutants. CEM “is simply the gathering of 
data, usually through observation or the collection of samples by lay persons. The majority of 
volunteers participate by monitoring some aspect of their local area” (Caiger & Coad, 1997: 
1). Such monitoring programmes may meet a variety of goals, including providing baseline 
data “to evaluate the effectiveness of conservation activities”, advance warning of impending 
ecological crises, and “the scientific basis for management action” (Munishi, 1996: 10). 
Some voluntary programmes compliment data gathered by government scientists while 
educating citizens and involving them in planning for sustainability, while others are targeted 
toward specific issues, involving data collection for advocacy work or multi-stakeholder 
monitoring (Whitelaw et al., 2003). In addition, “the presence of a monitoring team act as a 
deterrent to illegal activities” (Munishi, 1996: 10), which is important in itself and also hints at 




Both Caiger and Coad (1997) and Whitelaw et al. (2003) outline a number of benefits of 
CEM. First, citizens carrying out monitoring in their own area have the advantage of local 
knowledge which professional scientists may not possess; a volunteer who has lived in an 
area for years will often have a wealth of information about the local environment. Second, 
residents have a sense of community ownership and are therefore generally enthusiastic 
citizen scientists, often increasing their participation in public processes in general. Third, 
effective scientific monitoring often involves regular field work done over an extended period 
of time outside office hours, and governments can save costs when residents carry out this 
work. Fourth, regular monitoring may also allow residents to document changes that 
professional scientists on brief field visits may not notice, and point to areas where more 
intense scientific study may be necessary. Fifth, community members will likely be the first to 
notice problems like illegal harvesting or dumping, which can then quickly be reported to the 
appropriate authorities. Finally, CEM can be used as an educational tool, allowing 
participants to develop and/or share their knowledge of the natural world, scientific methods 
and environmental impacts. 
 
Some of the largest CEM projects involve documentation of the natural world to identify 
changes over time, for example in bird species numbers or the dates on which water bodies 
in cold climates freeze in the fall and thaw in the spring. However, CEM can also measure 
pollution, such as the ‘Bucket Brigades’ programme started by an American organisation 
called Global Community Monitor (GCM), which involves a simple method of testing air 
quality using a sampling device inside a modified five-gallon plastic bucket. Their work has 
led to the formation of citizens’ groups monitoring air quality in Australia, Canada, England, 
India, Kazakhstan, Kenya and South Africa, as well as the United States (GCM, 2006). The 
key is involvement by local experts in designing sampling protocols, and local laboratories in 
conducting the analysis. Where these partnerships can be developed, community members 
benefit from both greater awareness and the resources to address corporate environmental 
pollution (Turner & Wu, 2002). Such partnerships can prove particularly important when it 
comes to the reliability of the data collected. The development of standardised protocols 
geared to participants’ skills (Whitelaw et al., 2003), along with rigorous training for 
volunteers are key factors in ensuring that the data generated is accepted as valid not only 
by regulatory agencies, but also as part of any subsequent legal proceedings (Penrose & 
Call, 1995). 
 
One of the most widespread programmes is Water Watch, which has chapters throughout 
Canada and the U.S., functions as a national network in Australia, and is just being 




school groups who carry out physical and chemical testing along with ecological assessment 
to measure the health of their local watercourses. The group Global Water Watch also 
supports community-based water monitoring projects in Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, the 
Philippines, Thailand and China. 
 
2.3 Stakeholder Participation 
Water pollution poses serious challenges to the health of both human residents and the 
environments of which they are a part. Two potential approaches to such problems, VEAs 
and CEM, have been outlined. However, to be effective, these initiatives must at some stage 
be addressed through multi-stakeholder participatory processes, concepts which are 
explored in the following sections. 
 
2.3.1 The Nature of Participation 
“The words ‘participation’ and ‘participatory’ appeared for the first time in the development 
jargon during the late 1950s” (Rahnema, 1992: 117) and they have been the focal points of 
water policy development since the 1970s (Mollinga, 2008). Over the decades, these 
concepts have been lauded for their ability to improve relations and foster trust, resolve 
conflict, broaden awareness and create shared understanding, build confidence and 
capacity, and create empowerment (Beierle & Cayford, 2002; Servaes & Arnst, 1999). Some 
experts have suggested that participation is a goal in itself, while others see it as the means 
to accomplishing other goals (Burke, 1968), such as achieving consensus among diverse 
interests (Global Water Partnership, 2000). Attempting to define the term can be difficult, 
though; as White (1994: 16) points out, the concept is a “fragile and elusive … complex and 
dynamic … [and] undoubtedly contextual” one. Participation can be broadly described as an 
organised and equitable process which facilitates the exchange of thoughts and information 
(Appelstrand, 2002), or it may consist “of any strategies employed by social actors to alter 
their life-world” (Warner, 2006: 17). It may be short-term or long-term (Glew et al., 1995: 
396) and it may take place within formal institutional contexts or more informally (Warner, 
2006). While some maintain that participation must involve stakeholders directly, rather than 
engaging their elected representatives (Gaventa & Valderrama, 1999), others include 
indirect engagement through representatives as a form of participation (Global Water 
Partnership, 2000). Gaventa and Valderrama (1999) discussed three different types of 
participation: social and project participation, in which citizens take part in government or 
civil society programmes; political participation, in which they take part in the democratic 
process; and citizenship participation, in which citizens become involved in governance itself, 





“Participation requires that stakeholders at all levels of the social structure have an impact 
on decisions” (Global Water Partnership, 2000: 16). The degree of impact may vary widely, 
though, and participation does not mean the same thing to everyone (Renn et al., 1993). In 
1968, Burke identified a number of strategies for involving community members in decision-
making, suggesting that the method employed should be based on the goal of the public 
participation exercise. While participation may in some cases act as a means to develop 
self-confidence among participants, allowing them to take on responsibility for making 
decisions and bringing about change, in others the ultimate goal may be to change 
participants’ behaviour; yet other citizen participation strategies may be designed to recruit 
volunteers to carry out a part of an organisation’s mandate, to co-opt influential groups or 
individuals to increase legitimacy, or to build a broad base of support by leveraging existing 
power structures in order to argue from a position of strength (Burke, 1968). Not everyone 
would agree with Burke that all of these methods involve true participation, partly because 
some of his characterisations do not involve one of the most common elements of 
participation found in literature: the concept of stakeholders exerting, or attempting to exert, 
control or influence over decisions and outcomes which concern them (Appelstrand, 2002; 
Gaventa & Valderrama, 1999; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; Singer, 1995) - in other words, power. 
Power is a function of the relationships and resources which a person or an organisation can 
exert to achieve a desired outcome, in spite of opposition (Lozare, 1994). With regard to 
natural resource issues, power comes in many forms, including occupying positions of 
authority, possessing information, having financial means, being able to rally support, or 
enjoying privileged access (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2004). Many citizens do not hold any 
of these forms of power, and Arnstein’s seminal 1969 paper, “A ladder of citizen 
participation”, thus categorised participation based on the degree to which participants were 
able to wield power and influence by participating. 
 
Arnstein’s central thesis was that participation “is the redistribution of power that enables the 
have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be 
deliberately included in the future” (1969: 216). She thus presented an analysis of various 
exercises in participation based on the idea that with increasing power comes increasing 
influence and decision-making authority (Smith & McDonough, 2001). The first two 
categories on her ladder, manipulation and therapy, she wrote off as essentially public 
relations vehicles in which citizens are involved in activity but there is no genuine 
participation (Arnstein, 1969). This may be acknowledged at the outset, or may be a strategy 
employed by those who have learned how to covertly control, co-opt and even re-direct 
participants, while still being able to claim to have implemented participation (Rahnema, 




‘tokenism’, and other experts have since supported this view, noting, for example, that there 
is more to participation than consultation alone (Global Water Partnership, 2000). Irvin and 
Stansbury (2004) observe that ‘informing’, in which plans are presented by officials to 
citizens, sometimes without so much as an opportunity for comment, remains a popular tool 
despite its shortcomings. Both Dungumaro and Madulu (2003) and Gaventa and Valderrama 
(1999) cite numerous cases in which local communities’ involvement was solicited for 
consultation to fulfill the requirement for participation, but no community members took part 
in actual decision-making. Placation, in the form of bodies such as citizen advisory boards, is 
a slight improvement on consultation, but authorities remain in control of structures and 
information (Arnstein, 1969; Berkes, 2002; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). All three of these forms 
of ‘participation’ may be measured in terms of attendance at meetings, the number of 
questionnaires completed, or the number of proposals reviewed, but lack any accountable 
channel for feedback and may simply be used to legitimise official decisions (Arnstein, 1969; 
Global Water Partnership, 2000). Some have labelled these strategies ‘pseudo-participation’ 
(White, 1994). 
 
At the top of her ladder, Arnstein (1969) designates three categories which consist of true 
citizen participation: partnership, delegated power and citizen control. One of the central 
themes at these levels is that citizens share in, or even control, the process. All affected 
stakeholders should thus become involved in the early stages of planning, long before 
decision-making occurs (Appelstrand, 2002; Involve, 2005). In such processes, what Borrini-
Feyerabend et al. (2004) call ‘entitled actors’ are involved in developing the participatory 
framework, as well as sharing knowledge, resources and responsibilities via participation. 
With regard to natural resources, stakeholders must recognise their “common problem and 
[that] all parties are going to have to sacrifice some desires for the common good … [and 
accept] the need for change” (Global Water Partnership, 2000: 16). True participation must 
redistribute unequally-shared power, and is therefore likely to be resisted by vested interests 
(Lozare, 1994; Servaes & Arnst, 1999; Vivian, 1992), who are usually less than forthcoming 
in ceding it (Arnstein, 1969, Gaventa, 2004). Such participation is thus bound to lead to 
conflict (Vivian, 1992), which explains the idea of making sacrifices in order to reach 
collaborative solutions. On the other hand, Smith and McDonough (2001: 239) noted that 
“although many organizations attempt public participation, their efforts often fail to resolve 
conflicts, lead to greater support for decisions, or raise the level of trust between citizens and 
publics”. Based on their study of people who took part in a participatory process around 
natural resources management in Michigan, they proposed looking at participation in terms 




perceived to be fair (whether or not the outcome is seen as favourable) is key to building and 
maintaining trust and support among participants (Smith & McDonough, 2001).  
 
Participation undoubtedly has its limitations. Some authors have pointed out that it is not 
particularly efficient and “can lead to developments that are of an unpredictable nature” 
(Servaes & Arnst, 1999: 115). Participation “may not only slow down decision-making 
processes, it may actually lead to complete inaction by taking the place of real change” 
(Involve, 2005: 22). Others have noted that to gain the necessary knowledge and skills to 
make confident decisions, stakeholders may be required to invest years of commitment in 
participatory processes (Singer, 1995). However, the prevailing sentiment among 
proponents is that participation, like democracy, must be acknowledged as costly and time-
consuming, but that the benefits outweigh the costs (Appelstrand, 2002). They argue that the 
improved quality of the decision-making must be considered, as top-down decision-making 
not only runs the risk of excluding certain information and considerations, but also of not 
being supported – or possibly actively contested – by those affected (Involve, 2005). The 
sustainability of implementation without participatory decision-making is thus called into 
question (Servaes & Arnst, 1999). 
 
2.3.2 Identifying Stakeholders 
Having explored various interpretations of participation, the focus must now shift to those 
who are actually doing the participating: the stakeholders. According to Borrini-Feyerabend 
et al. (2004), the term ‘stakeholder’ was popularised in the field of business management, 
and has its origins in the colonisation of North America, when pioneers used stakes to mark 
the borders of the land to which they wished to claim title. While this interpretation implies 
the appropriation of as much of the resource as possible, Warner (2006: 17) takes a more 
neutral view, noting that anyone with a ‘stake’ in something has an interest in it or a claim to 
it. This view can be expanded to include anyone who may affect or be affected by a decision, 
be it an individual or an organisation (Involve, 2005), though Borrini-Feyerabend et al. (2004: 
40) make a distinction between individuals and institutional stakeholders, the latter being the 
“bearer[s] of specific interests and concerns organised to express them and carry them 
forward”. Whatever its derivation, the term ‘stakeholder’ has become widely accepted in the 
literature. According to the World Bank, stakeholders “are individuals, groups or institutions 
that are concerned with, or have an interest in the water resources and their management” 
(Warner, 2006: 17). When it comes to an essential resource like water, though, in reality 
everyone is a stakeholder (Global Water Partnership, 2000; Warner, 2006) – but 
unfortunately it is impossible for everyone to participate. Representation thus becomes 




representative and those who designate him or her, or indirect representation, in which an 
individual represents people with whom he or she rarely interacts, for example elected 
officials or NGO appointees (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2004). 
 
Determining who constitutes an essential stakeholder and how much representation each 
stakeholder group should be accorded is no easy task. It is of great importance, though, as a 
diversity of stakeholders is one of the keys to an effective forum (Mullen & Allison, 1999). 
With respect to water and other natural resource management issues, the list of 
stakeholders is long, including local users, businesses and industries, government agencies 
with relevant mandates at the national, regional and/or local level, environmental groups, 
academic and research institutions, elected officials, interest groups such as downstream 
users, influential individuals, and of course citizens (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2004; Griffin, 
1999). The four groups targeted during the establishment of catchment committees in 
Sweden, for example, were point and non-point source polluters, experts, water authorities, 
and the general public (Jonsson, 2005). In this thesis, stakeholders are categorised into 
three basic groups: government agencies and parastatals playing a regulatory role, for-profit 
corporations (in this case industrial operations), and affected citizens and non-profit interest 
groups such as NGOs. Each experience a variety of barriers and incentives to participation, 
and each bring different forms of knowledge, from social interests to technical expertise, to 
the process (Renn et al., 1993). But having identified stakeholders is just the first step. Next, 
they must participate. 
 
According to some experts, whether or not stakeholders participate is determined by the 
perceived balance between benefits, such as achieving goals, and costs, often in time and 
money (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Singer, 1995). In addition to the realisation of some 
benefit, Burke (1968) set forth a number of conditions that must exist for individuals to 
commit to participatory decision-making, including identification with and validation from 
other group members, and a shared awareness of the issues. Different stakeholders may 
respond differently to participatory processes based not only on their individual traits, but 
also on the nature of the process itself (Glew et al., 1995). All participatory processes “can 
be enhanced through better organization, improved participation strategies and mechanisms, 
and integration with other aspects of decision-making” (Carnes et al., 1998: 402). This last 
point is key, as people are far more likely to accept and work toward implementing a 
decision which they played some role in making (Burke, 1968). This begins to explain the 





2.3.3 Why Stakeholder Participation? 
 
“Technocratic decision making is incompatible with democratic ideals. The 
involvement of affected parties represents the political value of government 
by the people, not just for the people. If we take the ideal of democracy 
seriously, public participation is a normative prerequisite.”  
(Renn et al., 1993: 210) 
 
Although this statement seems to have been written from an American perspective, it 
nonetheless encapsulates the driving force behind stakeholder participation. As has already 
been discussed, understanding the knowledge, expertise and points of view of various 
stakeholders can assist in better understanding problems (Warner, 2006), while involving 
stakeholders in decision-making can lead to better decisions that have greater legitimacy 
(Involve, 2005). However while these claims are generally accepted, as has been noted 
there is considerable variation in the format of participatory decision-making and the degree 
to which power is delegated (Renn et al., 1993). A general description of a multi-stakeholder 
participatory process is one in which all relevant stakeholders come together to recognise a 
common problem and the need for cooperation in addressing it, and to work together toward 
developing and implementing solutions (Warner, 2006). ‘Relevant stakeholders’ may include 
all interested and affected parties, as well as experts and other citizens, all of whom 
contribute different expertise and experience (Renn et al., 1993). In fact, in his survey of 
participants in a multi-stakeholder forum regarding health care in Canada, Singer (1995) 
noted that government representatives, experts, elected officials and citizens were most 
commonly identified as those who should be involved in what he termed ‘combined decision-
making’ about this particular issue. He also noted that ‘self-selected’ members of the 
community who were eager to participate would be preferable to randomly-selected 
individuals. Renn et al. (1993: 190) based their argument for “multi-actor, multi-value, and 
multi-interest” representation on the need to capture "three forms of knowledge”: that “based 
on common sense and personal experience”, that “based on technical expertise”, and 
“knowledge derived from social interests and advocacy". Dungumaro and Madulu (2003) 
identified another consideration which is especially important in natural resource issues, the 
need to incorporate indigenous knowledge. Keeping in mind that stakeholder groups will 
vary by issue, the next important ingredient becomes the participatory process itself. 
 
In his study of multi-stakeholder platforms in southern Africa, South America, southern Asia 
and Europe, Warner (2006) identified six different types, from those with little influence, such 
as social networks or focus groups, through to broader social movements and eventually to 
‘river basin (co)management organizations’, where decision-making is delegated to 




participation. In a survey of public, private and civil society stakeholders conducted to 
evaluate public participation programmes within the United States Department of Energy’s 
Office of Environmental Management, Carnes et al. (1998) identified a number of attributes 
of successful public involvement. The three most highly rated by all respondents were that 
“the decision-making process is accepted as legitimate by stakeholders”, that the 
Department “understands public concerns”, and that “the decision-making process allows full 
and active stakeholder representation” (Carnes et al., 1998: 392). The core of this process is 
trust among stakeholders, which, as Acutt (2003: 20) emphasises, “can only be earned 
through good governance and transparency”. Efforts must be made to build this trust, as 
stakeholder participation is often critical to the success of a project. Dungumaro and Madulu 
(2003) describe cases in Tanzania where a lack of community participation led to the failure 
of water management projects. One project failed because the necessary skills required for 
equipment use and infrastructure maintenance were not imparted to the local participants, 
while another collapsed after local participants refused to take part in the project, likely due 
to a lack of understanding stemming from insufficient outreach (Dungumaro & Madulu, 2003). 
 
There are undoubtedly a number of criticisms of multi-stakeholder fora. Stakeholders have a 
range of interests, which may not be compatible, and thus overcoming pre-existing animosity 
and past experiences among stakeholders is very important to the building of trust (Cornwall, 
2004; Dungumaro & Madulu, 2003; Involve, 2005). Unfortunately this is not always easy, 
particularly in South Africa where past interactions between civil society and industry, which 
was often complicit in the apartheid system, have been less than positive (Hamann & Acutt, 
2003). This level of suspicion can colour new relationships and lead to a general 
unwillingness to engage in participatory processes, which, by their very nature, involve 
cooperation (Hamann & Acutt, 2003). Even where pre-existing issues do not influence 
stakeholders’ perceptions of each other, the fact that their perceptions, interests and 
objectives can be diverse and even opposed can easily create conflict (Lozare, 1994). In fact, 
in the United States watershed councils were often established as a result of the need to 
resolve conflict among stakeholder groups (Griffin, 1999). The use of interest-based 
negotiation, in which diverse stakeholders’ underlying needs are balanced in order to 
achieve equitable and mutually satisfactory results, is a good way to overcome conflicting 
positions (van Wyk et al., 2006). This consensus approach contrasts with rights-based 
negotiation, in which each stakeholder defends his or her perceived entitlement. Moving 
toward such a scenario, in which stakeholders are motivated to understand each others’ 
positions and regulatory agencies foster equitable interaction – if necessary redressing the 
power and information disparities among stakeholders – is particularly important with regard 




These inequities among stakeholders are not the only obstacles facing participatory 
processes once the interested parties are brought to the table, though. Not surprisingly, the 
more confident, knowledgeable and experienced stakeholders may well monopolise 
discussions (Involve, 2005). It has been noted that participants in multi-stakeholder fora may 
lack training and expertise as well as accountability, that they may not be truly representative 
of their constituency, and that they may be manipulated (Renn et al., 1993: 203). Glew et al. 
(1995) caution that in order for a participatory process to create substantial changes in 
participants’ attitudes, it must involve a long-term, ongoing experience. Irvin and Stansbury 
(2004) point out that geographically-limited multi-stakeholder processes where participants 
are representative of, and influential within, the main local constituencies are more likely to 
be effective. On the other hand, Griffin (1999), notes that leaving decision-making about 
water resources solely in the hands of local stakeholders may result in the exclusion of 
potentially important input from further afield, leading to a maximisation of local benefits to 
the detriment of a more comprehensive, holistic approach. While not all these problems are 
likely to beset every participatory process, they are common enough to hinder success. 
 
If such hurdles can be overcome, though, successful multi-stakeholder processes can lead 
to three strategic outcomes identified by Warner (2006): 
• ‘adaptive management’, the development of a shared understanding leading to a joint 
future vision through group learning, experimentation and compromise; 
• ‘democratization and empowerment’, the devolving of responsibilities to a representative 
forum which is not dominated by any one interest but gives voice to the concerns of 
marginalised groups in its discussions; and 
• ‘alternative dispute resolution’, in which conflict is managed through mediation and the 
ultimate goal is consensus (where possible). 
 
If conducted well, participation can lead to greater empowerment on the part of all 
stakeholders involved, be they individuals or organisations, as they develop increasing 
‘participatory competence’ (Prestby et al., 1990) and assume positions of importance among 
fellow decision-makers (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). Therefore, “if participation is such an 
important ingredient for the development of individual empowerment, it is imperative that we 
understand what promotes and what hinders participation” (Prestby et al., 1990: 144). 
 
2.4 Barriers 
“[T]he possibility for engagement cannot be taken as a given, even if mechanisms [for 
participation] are created” (Gaventa, 2004: 30). When certain stakeholder groups face 




unlikely to be representative (Griffin, 1999) and may in fact be rejected by the stakeholders 
who were denied involvement. Removing or overcoming these barriers to participation 
should thus be of great importance. In their survey of studies done in several African, Asian 
and Latin American countries, Gaventa and Valderrama (1999) identified several key 
barriers to participation, including the absence of enabling legislation and policy and the 
political will to use it, power relations, participants’ level of knowledge and skill, a 
consultative rather than truly participatory process, and insufficient funding or lack of control 
over financial resources. Individual stakeholders may be discouraged or prevented from 
participating by other factors, for example if the timing of meetings is inconvenient or if the 
venue is not a convenient, neutral location (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2004; Smith & 
McDonough, 2001). As shall be discussed, all of these barriers affect different stakeholder 
groups to different degrees.  It is worth noting that while Prestby et al. (1990) make a 
distinction between barriers to participation and costs of participation, as this dissertation is 
concerned with long-term participation – which may be cut short by costs – it does not 
recognise costs as separate factors. 
 
Widmer (1989) classifies barriers and incentives to participation in four categories: material 
(tangible elements such as goods or services), social (intangible elements such as status), 
developmental (intangible personal elements such as acquiring knowledge or 
responsibilities) and ideological (intangible personal elements such as satisfaction or 
gratification). For the purposes of this study, which will examine participation on the part of 
stakeholders ranging from large companies to individual citizens, four categories of barriers 
will be used: economic (financial costs), situational (e.g. time, physical conditions), 
developmental (knowledge, skills and/or ability) and socio-cultural (e.g. power inequity, level 
of community organisation). 
 
2.4.1 Local Residents and NGOs 
For citizens and members of NGOs, barriers to participation may be as basic as monetary, 
physical or time constraints (Griffin, 1999; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Wandersman et 
al., 1987). For disadvantaged individuals, one of the most basic barriers to participation is a 
lack of financial resources (Global Water Partnership, 2000) and/or prohibitive costs (Prestby 
et al., 1990), as well as a prioritisation of income-generation and daily family needs over 
attending meetings (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; Wandersman et al., 1987). Basic situational 
barriers include physical access problems for people with disabilities, child-care for parents 
of young children, or language barriers where translation is not feasible (Involve, 2005). 
Simply not having the time to devote to an intensive participatory process can also be an 




(by 45% of respondents) in one Canadian survey of reasons for non-participation in 
consultative processes in the Grand River watershed (Griffin, 1999). Similar results were 
found by Wandersman et al. (1987) in their study of participation in neighbourhood 
organisations in Israel and the Unites States. Other logistical barriers to citizen and NGO 
participation include the scheduling of meetings (weekdays versus evenings or weekends), 
their length, and the location at which they are held (Griffin, 1999); factors such as a nearby 
meeting location can be especially important for certain participants (Irvin & Stansbury, 
2004). As a result of these considerations, low-income earners and the self-employed are 
unlikely to be well-represented, while homemakers, retirees and public servants are often 
over-represented (Renn et al., 1993). Finally, the Grand River study found that 
approximately one-fifth of respondents declined to participate because they “thought the 
meeting would be a waste of time”; though more of a disincentive than a barrier, a 
participatory process that is long on talk but short on effective action may thus also 
discourage long-term participation (Berkes, 2002; Griffin, 1999: 512), as may dissatisfaction 
with progress achieved (Prestby et al., 1990; Wandersman et al., 1987). 
 
Another significant barrier to citizen participation is developmental, in which individuals lack 
the specific knowledge and skills to understand and address the issues at hand. In one 
Canadian study of community participation in decision-making about health care provision, 
researchers found that while citizens were eager to be consulted as part of the process, they 
increasingly favoured leaving decision-making to the experts as the intricacies of the process 
were explained (Singer, 1995). In the Grand River watershed study discussed previously, 
21% of respondents who declined to participate did so because they felt they “lacked the 
information to make a useful contribution“ (Griffin, 1999: 511). This suggests that a lack of 
knowledge, skills and experience can deter citizens from fully participating in situations 
involving scientific or technical information. Even when technical details are explained to 
citizen participants, they may not be adequately understood (Burke, 1968). In interviews 
conducted with members of local Conservation Commissions in the American states of 
Vermont and New Hampshire, Negra (1998) encountered some participants who felt that 
new members needed background knowledge in order to have credibility, while others felt 
that experience could be developed through participation; in the former case, people without 
the necessary expertise may in fact be discouraged from participating. Even if they do 
participate, individuals without the relevant knowledge or skills may devalue their own 
contributions based on their perceived lack of expertise (Jonsson, 2005) or be overpowered 






Lack of power or decision-making authority can also act as a barrier to participation by 
ordinary citizens (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). Given that “the control of the structure and 
processes for participation - defining spaces, actors, agendas, procedures - is usually in the 
hands [of] governmental institutions”, and may be controlled by local elites or even NGOs, 
citizens can fairly easily be excluded by elected officials and bureaucrats, especially at the 
local level (Gaventa & Valderrama, 1999: 7). Even when they are invited to participate, 
citizens often do not anticipate being able to influence decision-making. This is important, as 
Klandermans and Oegema (1987) found in their study of people asked to take part in 
activities organised by the Dutch peace movement: while 10% of people who eventually 
participated expected their participation to have no impact, this figure rose to 25% among 
eventual non-participants. Wandersman et al. (1987) point out that this scepticism about 
their ability to effect change is disproportionately found among the disadvantaged. 
 
In the aforementioned Grand River watershed study, almost one quarter of respondents 
opted not to participate because they did not expect their input to be taken into consideration 
(Griffin, 1999). This could be due to the perception of an unresponsive lead agency merely 
‘going through the motions’ of consultation, or it may be created by an unrepresentative 
forum in which a particular viewpoint or interest group dominates decision-making (Irvin & 
Stansbury, 2004; Smith & McDonough, 2001). Smith and McDonough (2001) describe a 
survey of public participants in an Ecosystem Management Project in Michigan in which 
some citizens felt they could not wield any influence unless they joined a group or hired legal 
representation. Power inequity can also contribute to government-administered participatory 
processes unwittingly excluding key stakeholders (Gaventa & Valderrama, 1999), because 
they are “outside the usual networks … [which] may reinforce existing inequalities of power 
and access to resources” (Involve, 2005: 29). Even in cases where all key stakeholders are 
represented, though, if a forum reaches a decision which is then ignored or overruled by the 
responsible government agency, it can reinforce participants’ powerlessness, resentment 
and cynicism (Griffin, 1999; Involve, 2005; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; Negra, 1998). The 
knowledge that key decisions are actually taken outside the participatory process, whether it 
is explicitly acknowledged at the outset or not, is a major disincentive to participation (Glew 
et al., 1995; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; Prestby et al., 1990). 
 
Other socio-cultural barriers can also play a role in limiting citizen participation. A lack of co-
operation from authorities and peers (Wandersman et al., 1987), feeling unwelcome within 
the group (Prestby et al., 1990), or a desire to avoid conflict (Burke, 1968) may all 
discourage participation. Vivian (1992: 70) notes that “the social, economic and political 




Gaventa and Valderrama (1999) found that participation was positively correlated with the 
pre-existing level of citizen organisation (such as unions) in a Bolivian study, suggesting a 
degree of fluency in, and/or social encouragement of, participation. At the other end of the 
spectrum, complacency can be equally problematic (Mullen & Allison, 1999; Negra, 1998). 
Irvin and Stansbury (2004) describe a watershed management planning process in Omaha, 
Nebraska in which a poorly-defined problem and general satisfaction with existing 
management, among other factors, resulted in an almost complete lack of citizen 
participation. Jonsson (2005) found the same problem in rural Sweden, where residents’ 
adequately-functioning water provision systems did not provide them with any incentive to 
get involved in broader water resource management. This problem is not only to be found in 
developed countries, but also in developing countries where ‘learned dependency’ has 
resulted in the loss of self-reliance among communities who have become conditioned to 
expect external solutions (Servaes & Arnst, 1999); fortunately, self-reliance can be 
developed through participation (White, 1994). 
 
In some cases, cultural norms may discourage or prevent participation by certain groups 
(Glew et al., 1995; Involve, 2005), while residents of certain regions may simply not have a 
history of active involvement (Mullen & Allison, 1999). When cultural differences exist among 
participants, even among individuals from the same area, communication barriers may arise 
(Servaes & Arnst, 1999). Factors such as class, ethnicity and gender can also play a role in 
creating the power imbalances discussed previously (Berkes, 2004). This effect can be 
subtle, influencing people’s confidence and world view, and thus the nature of their 
participation; listeners quickly form perceptions based, for example, on a speaker’s accent or 
choice of words (Gaventa, 2004). Interestingly, Wandersman et al. (1987) found that in the 
United States and Israel, in contrast with much of the literature on participation, factors such 
as education and race could not predict participation in neighbourhood associations, 
possibly because such groups are perceived as more accessible than larger multi-
stakeholder fora. In general though, whether citizens live in the United States or China, 
those who are “richer, more educated, and better able to bargain because they have more 
employment options” are the ones who can bring pressure to bear on pollution problems; 
unfortunately, the poor are the ones who tend to live in more polluted areas to begin with 
(Wheeler, 1999: 75). For citizens and members of NGOs, therefore, situational, 
developmental and socio-cultural barriers appear to be of roughly equal importance, while 






When it comes to pollution, “the rational man finds that his share of the cost of the wastes he 
discharges into the commons is less than the cost of purifying his wastes before releasing 
them” Hardin (1968: 1245). As long as a company perceives the costs of preventing pollution 
to be higher than the costs of not doing so, economic logic will dictate that it continues to 
pollute. Taking externalities into account, for example by instituting a ‘polluter pay’ system, 
can increase the costs of polluting and address this barrier. Resistance to organisational 
change is another powerful barrier preventing participation on the part of industry. To 
undertake measures such as pollution prevention, a company must re-envision all its 
processes (Lober, 1998). Unfortunately, “corporations do not widely view pollution 
prevention as an opportunity as its potential benefits are rarely recognized. Corporations 
also do not identify the factors that prevent or allow the marshaling of resources to exploit 
this potential opportunity” (Lober, 1998: 35). Perhaps an even more compelling barrier for a 
company that is resistant to change is the fact that participation usually requires more 
transparency related to information disclosure and independent assessment (Acutt, 2003). 
 
Though more a disincentive than a barrier, firms may be reluctant to participate due to 
satisfaction with the status quo. As Afsah et al. (1997) point out, regulatory agencies tend to 
be lenient on firms with political clout or those facing economic difficulties, in the latter case 
for fear of being held responsible for job losses; they note that examples of such lax 
enforcement can be found in countries as diverse as Indonesia and the United States. If a 
company has managed to avoid compliance with existing laws and does not anticipate 
implementation of stricter legislation in the future, there is no incentive for it to participate. 
Another barrier is the transparency required by participation, which reduces the opportunity 
for corruption (Wang et al., 2004) from which some may benefit. Finally, companies may 
simply view social and environmental concerns as the purview of government, not something 
which is part of a business mandate (Hamann & Acutt, 2003). For industry, then, 
participation is mainly limited by economic and situational barriers. 
 
2.4.3 Regulatory Agencies and Parastatals 
Three of the main barriers to initiating participatory processes for government and quasi-
government agencies are essentially economic, in the form of time, direct costs and staff 
resources (Griffin, 1999). Participatory decision-making can be complex and time-consuming 
(Porto et al., 1999; Servaes & Arnst, 1999); insufficient financial resources, especially at the 
local level, may constrain provision of opportunities for citizen participation (Burke, 1968; 
Gaventa & Valderrama, 1999). Even in rich nations like Sweden, budget cuts have meant a 




less expensive to allow an informed civil servant to take a decision than to engage in 
consultation, and extensive consultation can drain resources from other important work 
(Involve, 2005; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). Burke (1968) therefore notes that agency-led 
participatory processes must take into account both the mandate and means of the lead 
department, to ensure that staff have the time and resources to identify community leaders 
and other key players, assist participants in developing an accurate and complete 
understanding of the issues, and facilitate meaningful participation. While individual staff 
members at regulatory agencies and parastatals may be willing to commit to a participatory 
process, they may be relatively powerless in promoting involvement unless legislation exists 
to provide for it, and there is political will to encourage it (Gaventa & Valderrama, 1999). 
While South Africa does not lack enabling legislation, with cooperative governance forming a 
pillar of both the Constitution and the NEMA, political support may not be as strong. 
However, even if staff members are successful in instituting a multi-stakeholder process, 
bureaucratic rules and regulations may limit real engagement (Glew et al., 1995). 
 
The very fact that agencies are themselves the decision-making bodies may be a 
disincentive to participation, as they retain the final authority regardless of whether or not 
they participate (Griffin, 1999). Participation can also bring greater scrutiny and pressure to 
increase transparency with regard to monitoring and enforcement activities (Afsah et al., 
1997). Moreover, if instituting multi-stakeholder engagement will result in an agency being 
required to cede some of its power, this can be an additional disincentive (Griffin, 1999). 
Elected officials and bureaucrats, especially at the local level, may view participatory 
decision-making as undermining their role (Involve, 2005; Servaes & Arnst, 1999). 
Unfortunately, a flawed participatory process (for example, one unduly influenced by special 
interests) can lead to poor decision-making, but having given up control, government 
agencies and politicians may have no choice but to acquiesce (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). 
This problem can be compounded by the fact that while officials are accountable to the 
public for their actions, participants in multi-stakeholder processes generally are not (Griffin, 
1999; Involve, 2005; Renn et al., 1993). This may increase agency concerns about 
delegating authority to participants who are not perceived as having the necessary 
knowledge and experience to make decisions about technically-challenging issues (Involve, 
2005). It must be noted that these caveats may not apply to the most formal multi-
stakeholder bodies. For example, under the South African NWA, CMAs are constituted as 
legally-accountable entities functioning under a governing board and holding prescribed 





A final, but potentially important, barrier comes into play when regulatory agencies 
themselves are part of the problem. Research shows that globally, state-owned operations 
can be responsible for some of the worst pollution, and in Asia, they tend to emit more 
pollution and put fewer resources into abatement than firms in the private sector (Wheeler, 
1999). In such cases, not only do all the aforementioned barriers apply, but so do the 
financial and organisational change issues associated with industry stakeholders. Yabes 
(1992: 130) summarised some of the main barriers in his study of the Philippines’ Ilocos 
Norte Irrigation Project (INIP) as follows: “… the participatory approach was resisted by 
some INIP staff because it was felt to be too time-consuming, and because it would increase 
the complexity of project tasks, raise project costs, expand staff accountability, and change 
the status quo of planning methods”. Overall then, economic, situational and to some extent 
socio-cultural barriers limit regulatory agency and parastatal participation. 
 
2.5 Incentives 
An incentive is something that motivates action, or in this case, participation. In their study of 
neighbourhood associations in New York City, Prestby et al. (1990) found that what they 
termed ‘incentive management’ was one of the most important factors determining groups’ 
success or failure (which meant remaining active or becoming inactive). They placed what 
they called motivating ‘benefits’ of citizen participation into three categories: material 
(tangible rewards such as goods or services), solidarity (benefits derived from social 
interaction, such as status or recognition) and purposive (benefits derived from 
organisational goals, including community improvement) (Prestby et al., 1990). As discussed 
previously, in her classification system, Widmer (1989) uses four categories: material, social, 
developmental (intangible personal elements such as acquiring knowledge or 
responsibilities) and ideological (intangible personal elements such as satisfaction or 
gratification). With regard to corporations, Afsah et al. (1997) note that ‘reputational’ 
incentives - how the company is perceived - can be important. For the purposes of this study, 
the same four categories used for barriers will be used to classify incentives: economic 
(financial or material benefits), situational (e.g. convenience of location, improving 
conditions), developmental (e.g. learning, networking) and socio-cultural (e.g. influencing 
decisions, recognition). 
 
2.5.1 Local Residents and NGOs 
With respect to citizens and NGO members, the data on material incentives is unclear 
(Klandermans & Oegema, 1987), but they appear to be relatively unimportant (Prestby et al., 
1990; Wandersman et al., 1987). However, it should be noted that where the alternative is 




in terms of cost avoidance (Dent, 2008). Basic logistical incentives include limiting the 
number and length of meetings, providing child care, and offering safe transportation to and 
from meetings (Prestby et al., 1990). Other situational incentives are related to perception. 
Stakeholders are far more likely to be motivated to participate if they recognise the existence 
of a problem and are sufficiently concerned about it to want to effect change (Burke, 1968; 
Mullen & Allison, 1999). For example, the afore-mentioned study of neighbourhood 
organisations carried out by Wandersman et al. (1987) found that members of such 
residents’ associations perceived more problems, and therefore more need for action, than 
did non-members - though both groups were equally satisfied with their neighbourhoods. 
 
One of the advantages to citizens of involving themselves in multi-stakeholder processes is 
gaining new knowledge, skills and experience – including developing their ability to advocate 
effectively (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; Prestby et al., 1990). From a practical perspective, 
participants in Alabama’s Water Watch programme, for example, are taught skills ranging 
from water quality monitoring to the development of improvement strategies (Mullen & 
Allison, 1999). Developmental incentives can work both ways, though. Some stakeholders 
are actually more inclined to participate if they feel they have knowledge and expertise to 
contribute (Negra, 1998), whether this be through formal education and training, or personal 
– and often local – experience (Involve, 2005).  
 
Perhaps the most important factors in determining an individual’s willingness to participate 
are socio-cultural. Wandersman et al. (1987) found that people with strong roots in a 
community, who had lived there for a considerable length of time or planned to stay in the 
area, were more likely to participate in neighbourhood associations. One of the main 
incentives for citizen and NGO participants is the perceived ability to make a difference 
through participation (Burke, 1968; Mullen & Allison, 1999). This usually takes the form of 
having some influence over the decision-making process (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004) which will 
affect their lives in the future. Mirroring the disincentive to long-term participation found when 
stakeholders were dissatisfied with achievements made, progress and accomplishments 
were found to be an incentive for continued involvement (Burke, 1968; Wandersman et al., 
1987). Participating in a multi-stakeholder forum is also likely to result in citizens forming 
relationships with influential individuals, contacts which may prove valuable. Especially for 
marginalised individuals, such interaction can be empowering (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). A 
number of authors highlight the importance of providing not just collective but also personal 
(selective) incentives (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Prestby et al., 1990), so that 
individuals have some motivation to participate themselves, rather than assuming someone 




factors determining which groups within the Alabama Water Watch programme are most 
robust are whether volunteers live near the waterbody and/or use it for recreation. However, 
many people participate initially simply due to a personal contact and continue because they 
appreciate the social interaction and recognition, while others are motivated by the desire to 
contribute to their communities (Negra, 1998; Prestby et al., 1990). Other social incentives 
include a welcoming environment at meetings, the opportunity for social interaction (Prestby 
et al., 1990), and a sense of group identity (Burke, 1968). While situational and 
developmental incentives are important for citizens and members of NGOs, socio-cultural 
incentives play a greater role. 
 
2.5.2 Industry 
There is no question that for industrial stakeholders, the threat of financial penalties in the 
form of either discharge fees or fines and legal costs associated with legislative enforcement 
can act as powerful incentives to undertake pollution reduction programmes (Bansal & Roth, 
2000; Triana & Ortolano, 2005). After all, factory bosses only allow pollution because they 
want to reduce costs, and if it becomes more cost effective to put abatement measures in 
place, they will (Wheeler, 1999). Thus governments are making increasing use of regulated 
economic incentives such as pollution charges and tradable permits (Kraemer et al., 2001). 
Nonetheless, in their study of large firms in polluting industries in Belgium, Buysse and 
Verbeke (2003: 453) found that “environmental leadership is not associated with a rising 
importance of environmental regulations, thereby suggesting a role for voluntary 
cooperation”. Despite Lober’s (1998: 36) vision of pollution prevention as an opportunity for 
‘corporate self-renewal’, for profit-driven companies the most important incentives are 
generally economic ones. Within industrial operations, reviewing processes in order to 
achieve pollution prevention and environmental innovation can result in direct financial 
benefits such as reduced costs for disposal, material and liability, as well as increased 
efficiency and competitiveness (Bansal & Roth, 2000; Lober, 1998; Wheeler, 1999). 
Incentives may also be provided by regulators in the form of subsidies, or technical 
information and assistance (Khanna, 2001). A study of companies in Colombia noted that 
some were motivated to cut pollution due to environmental audit requirements imposed by 
parent multi-national corporations (Triana & Ortolano, 2005). Direct financial incentives, 
whether derived from production methods, regulators, or corporate owners and customers, 
are thus very important in motivating environmental progressiveness for industrial 
stakeholders. 
 
One may rightly question how such measures undertaken by industries relate to participation 




what Bansal and Roth (2000) term ‘corporate ecological responsiveness’. Their study of 
companies in the United Kingdom and Japan found that many firms were motivated by risk 
avoidance, for example avoiding clean-up costs or bad publicity by being proactive in 
addressing issues before they became problems. Practical situational incentives, such as 
improved health and safety conditions, or social incentives, such as better community 
relations, may also play a role (Khanna, 2001), though the latter depends on the culture in 
which a firm operates: Bansal and Roth (2000) found that firms in the U.K. were far more 
likely than those in Japan to concern themselves with their rapport with the local community. 
Sometimes communities make themselves heard through “social, political or physical 
sanctions”, examples of which Wheeler (1999: 59) documents from places as far-ranging as 
India and Brazil. The most innovative and progressive companies in the U.K./Japan study, 
though, tended to have strong environmental leadership and be focussed on social 
responsibility, along with the benefits to employee morale derived from simply doing ‘the 
right thing’; unfortunately such firms were very much in the minority (Bansal & Roth, 2000). 
In South Africa, for example, only 21% of the 100 largest companies by revenue produce a 
corporate responsibility (CR) strategy for public consumption (KPMG, 2008). These most 
advanced companies are also the most likely to work cooperatively with other stakeholders 
and to undertake commitments such as the VEAs discussed earlier (Buysse & Verbeke, 
2003).  
 
For firms that do not take a proactive stance, public pressure and regulators that make 
environmental performance information available to consumers can be very powerful 
motivators (Afsah et al., 1997; Khanna, 2001; Kraemer et al., 2001; Wang et al., 2004; 
Wheeler, 1999). After Indonesia’s Environmental Impact and Management Agency, 
BAPEDAL, began publicly revealing manufacturing companies’ environmental compliance 
and performance status using a simple five-category colour-coded system, within 18 months 
more than one quarter of the firms which had been non-compliant had achieved compliance 
(Afsah et al., 1997; Wheeler, 1999). A later programme in the Philippines, modelled on 
Indonesia’s, achieved equally impressive results in inducing compliance (Wheeler, 1999). 
Using a similar system, called GreenWatch, China’s State Environmental Protection Agency 
also documented improved compliance rates during pilot projects (Wang et al., 2004). 
Information disclosure is also used by regulators in countries such as Canada, the U.K. and 
the U.S. (Khanna, 2001; Kraemer et al., 2001), and where civil society is particularly active, 
NGOs may use information disclosure not just to target companies themselves, but also their 
clients and suppliers (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003). Conversely, when corporations are 
recognised for their achievements, they benefit not only from good external publicity, but 




This incentive depends heavily on the importance of reputation, though: an obscure firm may 
be relatively immune, while one in the public eye, or a company supplying such a firm, may 
experience significant market gains or losses based on pollution abatement or other 
environmental performance measures (Afsah et al., 1997). Despite the lack of consensus 
among experts on the importance of customers, shareholders and the local community in 
influencing corporate environmental policies (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003), such use of public 
pressure and market forces has recently become a major factor in spurring corporate 
participation. While local communities may exert social pressure, consumers and investors 
may apply financial pressure, not only by boycotting known polluters and their products 
(Buysse & Verbeke, 2003; Wang et al., 2004), but also by granting preference to 
corporations given public recognition of environmental achievements (Buysse & Verbeke, 
2003; Khanna, 2001). In South Africa, “sustainability reporting … is influenced by three 
major factors: the extent of a company’s environmental impact, its size, and its exposure to 
international markets and investors”, with both the first and last factors owing to internally- or 
externally-imposed norms and pressures (KPMG, 2008: 93). 
 
While the afore-mentioned study of large Belgian firms found that multi-national affiliates 
gave greater consideration to international customers and had more proactive environmental 
strategies than domestic firms (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003), other surveys conducted in 
southeast Asia, India and Mexico found no difference between the two groups (Wheeler, 
1999). However, multi-nationals do tend to respond more rapidly to pressure such as 
negative information disclosure, often due to customer demands (Lober, 1998; Wheeler, 
1999). Perhaps counter-intuitively, one study of the reaction of stock values to environmental 
news about a company found far larger increases (in reaction to good news) and decreases 
(in reaction to bad news) in emerging Latin American markets than in developed North 
American markets (Wheeler, 1999). In South Africa, large companies may be motivated both 
by local pressure and by the need to conform to accepted international environmental 
standards (Acutt, 2003). All of these ‘reputational’ factors can motivate companies to 
collaborate in good faith as part of multi-stakeholders processes (Afsah et al., 1997). On the 
other hand, Hamann and Acutt (2003) caution that some firms may be motivated to 
participate in multi-stakeholder processes only to enhance their image, attempt to control the 
process, or both. Therefore, while some industry incentives may involve situational and 
socio-cultural elements, the majority are primarily economic. 
 
2.5.3 Regulatory Agencies and Parastatals 
Government and quasi-government agencies are tasked with upholding and complying with 




making process may allow these agencies to save costs by reducing confrontational 
enforcement activities (Jonsson, 2005; Mullen & Allison, 1999) and avoiding expensive 
litigation (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; Jonsson, 2005). A study undertaken by Porto et al. (1999) 
found that since the creation of river basin committees composed of stakeholders and civil 
society in Brazil’s Ceará state, 80% of conflicts over water were resolved by the committees 
rather than in the courts. By moving beyond an enforcement approach, they may also be 
able to achieve more in terms of compliance, and with fewer resources, providing a dual 
incentive. The former executive director of the Corporación Autonoma Regional del Valle de 
Cauca, a regional infrastructure development and environmental protection organization in 
Colombia, attributed 70% of his agency’s highly-effective industrial water pollution control 
programme’s influence and success to the co-operative work his staff undertook directly with 
industry (Triana & Ortolano, 2005). While this collaborative approach may work best with 
environmental leaders (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003), by consulting with industry, government 
agencies can achieve a better understanding of the challenges involved in pollution 
abatement and show themselves to be willing partners. This strategy can work equally well 
with citizens: by involving them in the identification of both problems and acceptable 
solutions, it is possible to induce positive changes in behaviour (Dungumaro & Madulu, 
2003). 
 
While it may not earn them goodwill in industry circles, regulators may also opt to ‘partner’ 
with civil society by disclosing environmental performance information. A budget that did not 
allow for effective enforcement of regulations and a rapidly-expanding manufacturing sector 
prompted Indonesia’s BAPEDAL (mentioned previously) to begin publicly revealing 
environmental compliance information. Not only did the initiative cost far less than traditional 
enforcement, the subsequent attention that was focussed on the programme forced 
BAPEDAL to devote more resources to both inspections and data quality - resulting in 
better-targeted action - and raised both industry employers’ and employees’ levels of 
awareness of regulations (Afsah et al., 1997); all of this undoubtedly increased the agency’s 
effectiveness. 
 
Government agencies and parastatals may view participatory processes as a method by 
which to inform and educate the public and other stakeholders, and it is true that such 
processes can focus public attention and broaden awareness (Jonsson, 2005). For example, 
Kilvington (1998) documented increased public involvement arising simply from the fact that 
a multi-stakeholder catchment management group had been struck in the Whaingaroa 
Catchment near Hamilton, New Zealand. However, government agencies and parastatals 




with community preferences can prove particularly useful when policies are being developed 
(Irvin & Stansbury, 2004), because “experts and regulators are often restricted in their 
assessment of a project … local specifics or other dimensions of concerns [sic] are often 
neglected. Public participation helps to include these concerns in the decision making 
process and to avoid potential consequences of which the experts involved were not aware" 
(Renn et al., 1993: 209). Equally important is the opportunity to address concerns and build 
trust (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004), which should help to prevent delays and inefficiencies when 
it comes to project implementation (Jonsson, 2005). 
 
Another incentive for regulators is that participatory processes lead to decisions that are 
better understood and seen as more legitimate by the public (Appelstrand, 2002; Carnes et 
al., 1998; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). Involving all stakeholders is not only more likely to result 
in broad-based support for decisions, but should also reduce conflict among stakeholders, 
often an equally desirable outcome for regulatory agencies (Griffin, 1999; Jonsson, 2005). 
While the ceding of decision-making power was discussed as a barrier to government 
agency and parastatal participation, the reverse of this argument is that it allows agencies to 
avoid making, and taking the blame for, controversial decisions (Griffin, 1999). In fact, 
sometimes taking a facilitation approach to multi-stakeholder negotiation between industry 
and affected parties such as local residents and NGOs can produce the desired outcome 
while also garnering community support (Wheeler, 1999). Even if this ideal outcome does 
not materialise, engaging stakeholders is at the very least more productive than avoiding 
action on sensitive issues altogether, which is the easiest option (Dent, 2008). For regulatory 
agencies and parastatals, then, economic, situational, developmental and even to some 
degree socio-cultural incentives can affect participation. 
 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter presented a survey of some of the literature relevant to water pollution, the 
nature of stakeholder participation and the various barriers and incentives facing different 
stakeholder groups. It also outlined some possible approaches to maximising participation. 
The literature described herein was critical to informing the design of this particular research, 
which is described in Chapter 3. It focuses on the particular situation of Pietermaritzburg’s 
Baynespruit, and the methodology used in this study to identify non-regulatory barriers and 





Chapter 3:  Research Design and Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
To address the various objectives of the research, the research design and methodology 
included a number of different techniques as part of a case study approach. The analysis of 
past initiatives that have tried to address pollution in the Baynespruit included the use of 
historical print media coverage and expert consultations. Some direct and participant 
observation was also used to better understand stakeholders’ existing engagement and their 
views on the issues. However, the main research tool used in this study was semi-structured 
interviews conducted with individual stakeholders from government agencies and parastatals, 
industry, and local residents and NGOs. These interviews provided the basis for identifying 
stakeholders’ perceptions of the Baynespruit’s pollution problems and their effects, as well 
as the economic, situational, developmental and socio-cultural barriers and incentives to 
participation that exist for each stakeholder group. Data analysis was primarily descriptive, 
undertaken through interpretation and coding, with due regard for issues of reliability and 
validity. 
 
3.2 Research Design 
The aim of the research was to determine how non-regulatory barriers and incentives can 
influence stakeholder participation in reducing water pollution in the Baynespruit. The case 
study research design, explored in the following section, was thus determined by the setting 
in which the study was conducted, which is outlined thereafter. 
 
3.2.1 Case Study Research 
A case study involves research into one system (or a small number of systems) studied in 
context, about which in-depth, detailed information is collected (Hammersley & Gomm, 2000; 
Monette et al., 2002; Welman et al., 2005). Case studies allow for the exploration of 
complexity and uniqueness, something that is often impossible using other research 
methods (Orum et al., 1991; Stake, 1995; Welman et al., 2005; Yin, 1994). Though case 
studies enable a comprehensive understanding of a given situation or phenomenon, they 
face criticism in terms of their subjectivity and generalisability (Monette et al., 2002). On the 
other hand, they allow for “the grounding of observations and concepts … in natural settings 
studied at close hand” and often encourage the development of new theories (Orum et al., 
1991: 6). In fact, one of their goals is to allow the data themselves to generate the ideas, 





While case study research was pioneered in Europe (Tellis, 1997a), the Department of 
Sociology at the University of Chicago is credited with popularising the technique in the early 
1900s through research work conducted into the immigrant experience and other aspects of 
urban sociology (David, 2006, Tellis, 1997a). Though the case study as a research tool 
seemed to fall out of favour after World War II, it has experienced a resurgence in recent 
years (Orum et al., 1991). In fact, Hammersley and Gomm (2000), attribute the perceived 
waning of interest merely to the replacement of the term ‘case study’ by other phrases, such 
as ethnography, coined to describe essentially the same research approach. 
 
There is some debate about whether the case study is a methodological approach or a 
research paradigm (Hammersley & Gomm, 2000). Whichever definition one favours, case 
studies are extensively used not just in sociological research, but also in law, medicine, 
management, political science, history, teaching and other fields (David, 2006; Yin, 1994). 
Case studies may be exploratory, descriptive, explanatory or comparative (David, 2006; 
Tellis, 1997a; Yin, 1994), and they often use a narrative approach (Hammersley & Gomm, 
2000; Jocher, 2006). This exploratory case study took the form of an in-depth investigation 
into the stakeholders directly affecting, and affected by, pollution in the Baynespruit water 
course. According to Stake (1995), the most important consideration is therefore to learn as 
much as possible about the case, rather than being concerned about representativeness. 
Gaining such a “deep, rich appreciation of the individuals or situations from whom the data 
were collected” (Monette et al., 2002: 450) necessitates a comprehensive approach to data 
collection. Yin (1994) emphasises the importance of using multiple sources of evidence 
when conducting case study research, in order to achieve data convergence. While case 
studies usually make use of qualitative methods, these many data sources may also include 
quantitative methods (Monette et al., 2002; Orum et al., 1991). 
 
3.2.2 Setting 
Pietermaritzburg, the capital of South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal province, is located about 80 
kilometres inland of the Indian Ocean coastline in an area known as the Midlands. After 
1994, the city, its former townships, and surrounding rural areas were merged to form the 
new Msunduzi Municipality, which is home to some 600 000 residents (Msunduzi 
Municipality, 2008). Along with many other municipalities across the country, Msunduzi is 
struggling to maintain its existing infrastructure while also extending the provision of housing 
and basic services to those who lack them. The Baynespruit is wholly contained within the 
city’s urban area, as shown in Figure 3.1. The main stream and its smaller tributaries arise in 
the Northdale and Raisethorpe residential areas north of the Pietermaritzburg Central 




and past formal and informal settlements west of Eastwood, then through the community of 
Sobantu before joining the main uMsunduzi river. The community of Sobantu was chosen as 
the focus of the residential stakeholders group, in part because they live downstream of all 
the other factors contributing to solid and liquid waste pollution, but also because they need 
to make use of the water for gardening and small-scale agriculture. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Map of the Baynespruit catchment (uMsunduzi River in purple) 
 
Source: S. Terry, Umgeni Water (Aerial photo courtesy of Msunduzi Municipality, 2004) 
 
While there is a lack of detailed demographic information specific to the Sobantu community, 
the most recent South African Census (Statistics SA, 2001) contains some useful data. At 
that time, Sobantu was grouped with the Lincoln Meade neighbourhood to the south as 
Ward 35; due to the fact that few (if any) black Africans lived in Lincoln Meade then, and that 
few (if any) non-black Africans live in Sobantu, the Sobantu community likely made up about 












population of 12 532. Education levels had risen in the ward since the 1996 census, with 
54% of residents having had at least some secondary education. However, only 53% of the 
total labour force was actually employed, with those jobs mainly being in the social services, 
manufacturing and retail sectors; more than 8 000 residents reported no monthly income, 
and a further 2 200 reported monthly incomes of R 1 600 or less. Despite these figures, 87% 
of residents lived in a formal dwelling (house), 88% of households used electricity for lighting, 
92% reported weekly municipal refuse collection and 91% had a flush toilet (Statistics SA, 
2001). However, given that some 18% of Ward 35 consisted of the middle-class residents of 
Lincoln Meade, and that the figures presented here are for the ward as a whole, the true 
unemployment and poverty figures for Sobantu are likely higher, while the education and 
municipal services-provision figures are probably lower. 
 
The Msunduzi Municipality’s Area-Based Management programme provides additional 
descriptive information about the Sobantu neighbourhood. According to the programme, 
homes in the area consist of two to four rooms, each with water and sewer connections, 
located along tarred roads. Sobantu has both a primary and a secondary school, a health 
clinic, a community hall, a sports field and a swimming pool. Founded in 1928, the tight-knit 
community’s residents have a history of working together on projects such as agricultural 
development (Msunduzi Municipality, n.d.). The neighbourhood’s ethnically homogenous 
population likely makes this task easier, as only 126 people in all of Ward 35 listed an 
African language other than isiZulu as the language they spoke most often at home 
(Statistics SA, 2001). In this atmosphere of collaboration, in early 2008 a number of local 
groups including the Sobantu Environment Desk Network 96 (SEDN96) and the Sikhuthele 
Community Club (formerly Community Farming Co-op 1) merged to form a new umbrella 
organisation, the Sobantu Environmental and Agricultural Forum (SEAF), to create a strong, 
united voice for the community. This is important, as not only are residents faced with water 
pollution in the Baynespruit, they and others downwind also contend with air pollution in the 
form of smoke from the nearby municipal landfill (Epprecht, 2006; Msunduzi Municipality, 
n.d.). 
 
Many residents of Sobantu work at the factories in the nearby WIA (Msunduzi Municipality, 
n.d.), and they were among those affected by the steady decline in the footwear 
manufacturing industry. While the remaining industries offer employment possibilities for 
local residents, anecdotal evidence suggests that owners and management at the factories 
represent an entirely different constituency. Of the 24 companies located along the 
Baynespruit that were contacted by the Duzi-uMngeni Conservation Trust (DUCT), the 




roughly evenly split between those of European and Indian heritage. The companies 
themselves range in size from small to large; some are independent while others are 
subsidiaries of national or even multi-national operations. The factories manufacture a range 
of products, including carpets, chemicals, food and toilet paper, for both domestic 
consumption and export. From a water pollution perspective, “legal and illegal discharges 
from factories are a major problem ... on the Baynespruit tributary, which drains the 
Willowton Industrial area” (WRC, 2002: 20). The most contentious factories have historically 
been the four large edible oil, soap and candle manufacturers. As will be outlined in section 
4.2.1, these industries have been reprimanded numerous times by regulatory agencies - the 
DWAF and Msunduzi Municipality - for effluent discharges to both the municipal sewer 
system and the stormwater drains which empty into the Baynespruit. 
 
However, there have also been cases in which the local municipality itself has been 
threatened with legal action by the DWAF over its failure to comply with water quality 
standards. Two trunk sewer lines traverse parallel to the Baynespruit river, which drains a 
large urban and industrial catchment; problems here include blockages, old and/or 
redundant infrastructure in need of maintenance or replacement, siltation, illegal trade 
effluent discharges in the lower catchment and illegal stormwater connections to sewers in 
the upper catchment that contribute to sewer surges during storm events (Sivparsad, 2008). 
DWAF is not the only organisation drawing attention to these problems, though. Established 
in 2005 and registered as a non-profit organisation the following year, the DUCT is 
headquartered in Pietermaritzburg and focuses on the catchments of the uMsunduzi and 
uMngeni rivers, which eventually join before flowing to the ocean. Initially formed by a group 
of paddlers, its constituency includes other recreational watercourse users, farmers, and 
local communities who regularly use river water in the catchment area. Through a variety of 
funding and labour partnerships with individual volunteers, organisations and businesses, 
the DUCT coordinates activities such as cleaning up litter, removing alien invasive species, 
planting trees, reducing soil erosion, and implementing education and awareness campaigns. 
With working groups from Howick (25 kilometres northwest of Pietermaritzburg) to Durban 
(80 kilometres southeast of Pietermaritzburg, on the coast), the DUCT is able to ”assess, 
monitor and implement various projects to enhance river health along the length of the 
uMsunduzi and uMngeni rivers” (DUCT, 2008). 
 
3.3 Research Methodology 
This study made use of a qualitative, anti-positivist research methodology, in which 
subjective data were collected through quasi-participatory research. Participatory research 




gaining an understanding of their situation, confidence, and an ability to change that 
situation” (Servaes & Arnst, 1999: 110). This style of research involves “a collaborative 
process that unites inquiry, education, and social action” (Friesen, 1999: 281). While this 
study was not undertaken by the affected parties themselves, it was conducted with the aim 
of facilitating effective stakeholder participation, thereby enhancing the chances of group 
action to address the problem of water pollution in the Baynespruit. The research was 
conceived and conducted in partnership with the DUCT, a local NGO, and was intended to 
contribute to the successful establishment of the Baynespruit Conservancy; it also had the 
interest and support of local residents from an early stage. It is thus mostly appropriately 
classed as a quasi-participatory case study. 
 
3.3.1 Population and Sample Selection 
This case study was limited to in-depth interviews with a small sample of 17 stakeholders 
directly affected by water pollution in the Baynespruit. This included those who live, work (in 
industry, for an agency or parastatal, or in small-scale agriculture) and play (undertaking 
recreational activities such as canoeing) along the Baynespruit or immediately downstream 
of its confluence with the uMsunduzi River. While all interviews were conducted with 
individuals, many were consciously presenting the perspective of a larger group, be it their 
community, company or agency. Appendix B lists the individuals interviewed and their 
affiliations. 
 
Stake (1995: 56) asserts that case study researchers must make use of the “best persons, 
places, and occasions …[to] help us understand the case”. Therefore, purposive (non-
probability) sampling was used to select the interview subjects from among industry 
representatives, residents of Sobantu, local small-scale farmers and NGO representatives. 
Selection to achieve a representative sample made use of the knowledge and experience of 
elected officials, regulatory agency and parastatal staff, and members of NGOs. To account 
for non-responses, a greater number of interview subjects were identified than were actually 
required. The sampling criteria varied by category. Representatives from government 
agencies and parastatals were chosen based on their job description, with a focus on those 
who had been involved in addressing and/or monitoring some aspect of solid and/or liquid 
pollution in the Baynespruit. Representatives from industry were also chosen based on their 
job description, with interviews generally being conducted with operations and/or quality 
managers. In the case of local residents, small-scale farmers and NGO members, an 
attempt was made to choose a range of individuals representing different viewpoints (youth, 





3.3.2 Research Techniques 
As suggested by Stake (1995) and Yin (1994), a number of different techniques mining a 
variety of sources of evidence were used to carry out this study. 
 
Table 3.1: Techniques used and evidence collected to address research objectives 




• analysing past initiatives 
• understanding stakeholders’ views 
• identifying barriers and incentives 
Documentation Local Newspapers 
• analysing past initiatives 





• understanding stakeholders’ views 
• identifying barriers and incentives 
Direct observation 
Attendance at meetings 
among stakeholders 
• understanding stakeholders’ views 
• identifying barriers and incentives 
 
As shown in Table 3.1, the main measuring instrument was a semi-structured interview, 
which is further explained in the following section. The interviews addressed each of the 
research sub-objectives, including analysing past initiatives that have addressed pollution in 
the Baynespruit, understanding stakeholders’ views of the pollution problems and their 
effects, and identifying barriers and incentives to participation affecting each stakeholder 
group. To supplement the analysis of past initiatives, documentation in the form of articles on 
water pollution issues published in local newspapers between 1980 and 2001 (compiled by a 
former faculty member at the Centre for Environment, Agriculture and Development) were 
consulted; in addition, a few of the people involved in past initiatives were contacted and 
provided the researcher with information by telephone or e-mail. Finally, to better understand 
stakeholders’ existing engagement and their views on the issues, both participant and direct 
observation were also used. Participant observation came in the form of conversations with 
representatives of the two dozen industries in the Baynespruit catchment (as their 
participation in the Baynespruit Conservancy was solicited) and at the inaugural meeting of 
the Conservancy at which key stakeholders gathered. Direct observation was primarily 
carried out via attendance at the quarterly meetings of the Msunduzi Catchment 
Management Forum (MCMF), but also at other meetings, such as one between the Sobantu 
community and municipal officials. 
 
3.3.3 Measuring Instrument 
As this was a qualitative case study, the measuring instrument was aimed at uncovering 
subjects’ perspectives and motivations, rather than proving or disproving a research 




understanding of stakeholders’ views and experiences as well as the economic, situational, 
developmental and socio-cultural factors enhancing or hindering their ability to work with 
other parties to find solutions to common problems. Though interviews are time-consuming 
and run the risk of introducing researcher bias in interpreting responses (Monette et al., 
2002; Sewell, 1998), they offer far greater control and flexibility in terms of gathering the 
required information (Barriball & While, 1994; Monette et al., 2002; Sewell, 1998). Not only 
are interviews ideally suited to uncovering what Stake (1995) terms the ‘multiple realities’ of 
how the issue is percieved by the different stakeholders, they also offer an opportunity for 
social interaction, which can add to the researcher’s understanding (Barriball & While, 1994; 
Kelly, 1999). Semi-structured interviews in particular can be tailored to a varied group of 
respondents, such as the Baynespruit stakeholders, and are “well suited for the exploration 
of the perceptions and opinions of respondents regarding complex and sometimes sensitive 
issues and enable probing for more information and clarification of answers” (Barriball & 
While, 1994: 330). A set of interview questions was thus devised as the measuring 






Figure 3.2: Development of the interview questions 
 
While the interviews followed a structured set of questions, they were unstructured to the 
extent that follow-up questions were asked to invite respondents to expand on particular 
topics in order to deepen the researcher’s understanding. The intention was to elicit 
information about both apparent and more implicit barriers and incentives to participation by 
asking both direct and open-ended questions. Open-ended questions are most useful when 
there are many possible responses and the researcher does not wish to restrict the subject’s 
answer (Monette et al., 2002), which was indeed the case in this study; furthermore, it was 
hoped that the use of open-ended questions would draw out the implicit reasoning behind 
respondents’ thought-processes and uncover deeper meaning. Finally, a certain amount of 
redundancy was built into the questions, to both test respondents’ consistency and allow 
them to elaborate on and/or emphasise important aspects. The interview questions were 
initially formulated by the researcher, and further refined in discussions with the research 
supervisor and staff at the DUCT. Pre-testing was conducted in a pilot study of five 
stakeholders, and the questions were subsequently refined; this is further discussed in 






















interviews and reflecting on the information gathered to date all contributed to deepening the 














Figure 3.3: Deeper Levels of Learning (create increasing awareness of the larger whole)  
 
Source: Senge et al., 2005: 11. 
 
Prior to beginning the interview, the research was briefly re-explained to help put the 
respondent at ease (Leech, 2002). Introductory questions involved general, non-threatening 
queries to prompt the respondent to talk about his or her relationship to the Baynespruit and 
its impacts on his or her daily life; it was hoped that a good rapport and a relaxed 
atmosphere could be established by asking such questions first, as recommended by Kelly 
(1999), Leech (2002) and Monette et al. (2002). Subsequent questions probed for responses 
to address the research objectives more specifically. First, a series of questions were asked 
about the respondent’s perception of the pollution in the river and how it affects him or her. 
The bulk of the remainder of the interview then focussed on multi-stakeholder processes, 
barriers and incentives to participation faced by the respondent, and his or her views on how 
the Baynespruit’s pollution problems could be addressed. Finally, a few questions specific to 
the individual stakeholder groups (local residents and NGOs, industries, and regulatory 
agencies and parastatals) were posed. In general, questions were framed in terms of “what” 
or “how”, rather than “why”, to avoid defensiveness (Charmaz, 1991) or speculation by the 
respondent about the reasons for his or her actions or feelings (Kelly, 1999).  
 
It was projected that the interviews would require approximately one hour to complete. While 
no audio recordings were made during the interviews, to avoid the possible distraction cited 






















































possible – in order to reduce interpretation and potential bias on the part of the researcher, 
as noted by Monette et al. (2002). All respondents were assured of anonymity; though some 
respondents stated that this was not necessary, it was of some concern to others, especially 
those who were speaking in an official capacity. Bradburn and Sudman (1979) found a 
positive correlation between complete confidentiality and respondents’ willingness to answer 
sensitive questions, and it was hoped that anonymity would encourage more candid 
discussion during interviews. While the same authors found little effect from the presence of 
third parties in interviews conducted with adults (Bradburn & Sudman, 1979), interviews 
were conducted in a quiet, private setting as much as possible. Unfortunately interruptions 
were unavoidable in the few cases in which interviews were conducted in the subject’s office. 
 
3.4 Procedure 
Once the research topic had been identified, a preliminary literature review was carried out 
and a research proposal drafted. Based on the tasks and timeline outlined therein, the study 
began with the development of the interview questions and the submission of an ethical 
clearance form to comply with university requirements. The next step was to identify and 
contact the interview subjects: in several cases, contact was made in person at a meeting of 
the MCMF; a preliminary introduction to the research was made to some residents of 
Sobantu through the local ward councillor, and this was followed by personal contact at a 
subsequent DUCT-SEAF meeting, or by telephone; industry representatives were contacted 
via an introductory letter and follow-up telephone call. Interviews were arranged for a time 
and place convenient to the respondent. One or two non-responses were encountered 
among stakeholders initially contacted in each of the groups, but none of the stakeholders 
with whom contact was established refused to be interviewed. 
 
An initial pilot study of the measuring instrument was carried out, which resulted in a 
refinement of the interview technique.  All interviews were conducted in Pietermaritzburg, 
generally at the subjects’ workplaces, but occasionally at their homes or another convenient 
location. The objectives of the study were first explained to potential interview subjects, all of 
whom subsequently granted permission to conduct the interview. Subjects were described 
using biographical information to maintain anonymity. Though the option of conducting the 
interview in isiZulu (through an interpreter) was offered, only one respondent was not fully 
comfortable conducting the interview in English, and that subject elected to use a family 
member for assistance when translation was required. The researcher made detailed notes 




While interviews were being arranged and conducted, the literature review continued and the 
analysis of historical documentation and contact with knowledgeable individuals were also 
initiated. As data were collected, data interpretation and analysis began. 
 
3.5 Data Interpretation and Analysis 
The importance of the researcher as a factor in case study research is widely recognised as 
being greater than for most other research approaches (Stake, 1995; Tellis, 1997a; Yin, 
1994). To reduce the subjectivity inherent in such studies, the researcher must approach 
each task with great thoroughness (Jocher, 2006), and always have the research questions 
in mind (Stake, 1995). In addition, Yin (1994) lists a number of requirements for an 
investigator to be successful in carrying out case study research, including extensive 
background knowledge of the issues, an unbiased and flexible approach, and the ability to 
ask the right questions, then listen carefully to – and correctly interpret – the answers. Once 
data collection is underway, both Jocher (2006) and Stake (1995) emphasise the value of 
clear and concise descriptions of all observations which may prove significant during later 
interpretation and the drawing of conclusions. Stake (1995) goes so far as to claim that 
recordings and/or notes made during interviews are less important than drafting a record of 
the interview and what he terms ‘interpretive commentary’ after the fact. 
 
“Data analysis consists of examining, categorizing, tabulating, or otherwise recombining the 
evidence to address the initial propositions of a study. Analyzing case study evidence is 
especially difficult because the strategies and techniques have not been well defined in the 
past" (Yin, 1994: 102). In fact, it may not be possible to define them, as case studies 
commonly use what Monette et al. (2002) term ‘narrative analysis’. In this qualitative 
analytical device, interviews and other data sources are used to create a detailed description, 
often making use of direct quotes from subjects. This direct interpretation of the various 
sources of evidence to identify trends, underlying thought processes and the reasons behind 
stakeholders’ actions was used extensively in this case study. The goal was to achieve an 
understanding of the relationships within this particular social system, and the potential for 
various stakeholders to become fully involved in meaningful participation to reduce water 
pollution; it was hoped that this research would generate new insight in this regard. Thus one 
of the main analytical methods used was the recognition of patterns in the data, and the 
comparison of actual and predicted patterns as described by Stake (1995) and Yin (1994). 
 
Though case study research is not focussed on categorising (Monette et al., 2002), the raw 
data obtained from the interviews were nonetheless summarised to identify common 




This was undertaken primarily through the use of coding, in which categories of responses 
were developed based on the data. According to the methods outlined by Monette et al. 
(2002), a combination of simple descriptive and more subjective interpretive codes were 
used to identify dominant themes in the data, with the coding moving from open (or 
unrestricted) methods initially, to focussed coding in which the data were organised into a 
more limited set of categories. This complemented the less structured analysis which was 
accomplished through reflection on the diverse information as it was gathered in increasing 
quantities; this reflection allowed for what Stake (1995) termed ‘categorical aggregation’, the 
accumulation of examples in order to make a statement about a particular group. Such 
continuous feedback between data collection and theory development can play a key role in 
qualitative data analysis (Monette et al., 2002). 
 
Barriers and incentives to participation were also categorised, for the purposes of this study, 
into one of four categories: economic, situational, developmental and socio-cultural. As 
noted in the literature review, different authors have classified barriers and incentives in a 
number of different ways. However, it was felt that these four categories would be useful to 
contrast the relative importance of the various barriers and incentives to different stakeholder 
groups, as displayed in Figure 3.4, with the arrow’s width representing the magnitude of the 












Figure 3.4: Conceptualisation of the predicted relative importance of economic, situational, 
developmental and socio-cultural barriers and incentives. 
 
Economic barriers and incentives consisted of any financial or material costs or benefits, 
situational barriers and incentives of practicalities such as time considerations or 
living/working conditions, developmental barriers and incentives of knowledge and skills-
related elements, and socio-cultural barriers and incentives of considerations such as power 

































inequity, recognition and values. It was initially theorised that each of these categories of 
barriers and incentives would play a greater or lesser role with respect to each stakeholder 
group, as shown in Figure 3.4. 
 
3.6 Validity and Reliability 
To ensure high quality research whose conclusions contribute to the body of knowledge on a 
particular topic, issues of validity and reliability must be addressed. This is particularly 
important in case study research, which has traditionally been perceived as lacking in some 
of these areas (Orum et al., 1991; Riege, 2003; Yin, 1994). Construct, internal and external 
validity, as well as reliability, are each addressed in turn herein. As noted previously, one of 
the main threats to construct validity is the subjectivity inherent in case study research 
(Riege, 2003; Yin, 1994). Both Riege (2003) and Yin (1994) suggest using multiple sources 
when collecting evidence, as well as establishing a chain of evidence, including transcripts of 
interviews. In this study, data collected via a semi-structured interview technique were 
supplemented by the use of documentation, participant observation and direct observation; 
while records of interviews and other conversations were kept, more detailed notes likely 
should have been taken. 
 
As descriptive case studies do not profess to determine causation, internal validity is not a 
major concern (Yin, 1994). With regard to external validity, a number of different approaches 
can be found in the literature. Case studies focus on analytical, rather than statistical, 
generalisation (Riege, 2003; Yin, 1994), and it is especially difficult to demonstrate external 
validity in a one-case study (Tellis, 1997b). Yin (1994: 36) recommends trying to “generalize 
a particular set of results to some broader theory”, and this has been attempted in 
subsequent chapters of this study. However, Monette et al. (2002) note that when the goal is 
to provide a thorough contextualisation and understanding of a particular case, deriving 
generalisations from the data which can be applied to other cases is not of primary 
importance. Servaes and Arnst (1999) further state that participatory research, by its very 
nature, is focussed not on objectivity and external validity, but rather on the applicability of 
the research in assisting those under study, and therefore also on the wide distribution of the 
results among said subjects. So while the external validity of this study may not be high, it is 
nonetheless hoped that the research results will assist not only the Baynespruit 
Conservancy, but also other stakeholder-participation processes such as CMAs or other 
similar fora. 
 
While qualitative research, in general, is less concerned than is quantitative research with 




research, one of the main ways of ensuring reliability is the use of several different sources 
of data (Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994). As mentioned previously, this study did indeed use multiple 
sources of evidence; this allows for triangulation, in which information from one source is 
substantiated by information from other sources (Stake, 1995; Tellis, 1997b). Another way to 
increase reliability is through the development of a case study protocol to guide the 
researcher, which should include an overview of the project and its objectives, field 
procedures, research questions and a reporting plan (Yin, 1994). In this study, these 
elements were developed and presented as part of the initial project plan. 
 
As the semi-structured interview technique played such a key role in this research, it merits 
separate discussion. One of the main ways of reducing threats to the reliability of interview 
data, based on a researcher’s bias or level of skill and/or the effectiveness of the questions 
themselves, involves conducting a pilot test (Appleton, 1995; Barriball & While, 1994; 
Welman et al., 2005). In this research, a pilot study was conducted in which the interview 
questions were pre-tested on a small group of respondents. To increase the research validity 
and reliability, these preliminary results were used to adapt the research design. The pilot 
study involved two residents and farmers in Sobantu, two representatives of regulatory 
agencies and parastatals, and an elected municipal official. While the pilot study did not 
uncover any new or surprising issues not previously identified in background reading 
material, it did reveal a difference in perception among stakeholders between those who felt 
that industrial pollution was the most important problem and those who cited sewer 
surcharges and human waste contamination as the greater concern. It was also found that 
due to staff and volunteer turnover, key players from past initiatives were no longer available 
to shed light on the goals and difficulties involved. Perhaps due to miscommunication, some 
people who were identified as important players proved to have been only peripherally 
involved. 
 
The major weakness in the measuring instrument highlighted by the pilot study was in the 
area of identifying barriers and incentives to participation. This was identified through 
evaluation of interview subjects’ responses with the research supervisor. While the existing 
questions were efficient at eliciting information about obvious barriers and incentives, mainly 
situational considerations such as logistics, they were not successful at drawing out 
underlying issues. Some of the questions were thus modified and/or added to, and additional 
follow-up questions were asked to elicit more implicit issues. Another factor was that the time 
required proved to vary with the interview subjects. Residents and farmers tended to be 
more direct in answering questions and therefore required an hour or less to cover all 




or covered the same ground more than once as subsequent questions focussed on ideas 
they had already mentioned in another context. 
 
The fact that the stakeholders interviewed varied widely in their demographic profiles must 
be considered. Barriball and While (1994: 330) note that in such cases “validity and reliability 
depend, not upon the repeated use of the same words in each question, but upon conveying 
equivalence of meaning”. Indeed, the questions were sometimes adapted to suit an 
individual, and the pilot study assisted the researcher in developing alternative phrasing to 
express certain questions. Moreover, researchers have noted differences in responses given 
when a respondent’s race, religion or gender, for example, differs from that of the interviewer 
(Barriball & While, 1994; Monette et al., 2002). It is impossible to ignore this as a factor in 
this research, as at least one (and often all three) of these differences were present in all but 
one of the interviews conducted. 
 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter began with a description of the research design, including a discussion of the 
case study approach and the setting in which the study was conducted. It then focussed 
more specifically on the research methodology followed, including how subjects were 
selected from the target populations, the variety of research techniques employed, and the 
primary measuring instrument, a semi-structured interview. Following a description of the 
research procedure, the data interpretation and analysis process was outlined, and issues of 
validity and reliability were addressed. With the research framework described, Chapter 4 
presents the data compiled, and discusses it with respect to the different stakeholder groups’ 






Chapter 4:  Results and Discussion 
 
4.1 Introduction 
With case studies, “there is no particular moment when data analysis begins. Analysis is a 
matter of giving meaning to first impressions as well as to final compilations” (Stake, 1995: 
71). This chapter synthesises and discusses the results of this ongoing process. It begins by 
framing the present situation within its historical context, and gleaning information from past 
initiatives to address pollution in the Baynespruit. It goes on to present stakeholders’ views 
of the problem, which vary substantially by group, though certain truths are widely 
acknowledged. The final sections discuss the findings with respect to the barriers and 
incentives to stakeholder participation. The actual results differed somewhat from 
expectations formed by consulting the literature, in some cases due to circumstances 
particular to this case. 
 
4.2 History of Pollution and Remediation Efforts in the Baynespruit 
“ …the pollution in that stream is more than 20 years old. The problem started when [the 
landfill refused to accept] the liquid [effluent] from the factories in the 1980s, they started 
pumping into the river. Before that, it was a clean river … full of fish.” 
 
This observation was made by a long-time resident of Sobantu and member of the SEAF. 
Not only does it provide a timeline over which to view the problem, it is also a reminder of 
what the Baynespruit once was – and could be again. While extremely high levels of sewage 
and the widespread dumping of garbage, along with alien invasive plants, are undoubtedly 
contributing to the degradation of the stream, this statement traces the worst pollution to 
industrial effluent from the WIA, which is further documented in the following section. The 
development of the WIA was not accidental. The original idea was to provide employment 
opportunities, especially for black Africans – hence the location of a major industrial area in 
close proximity to Sobantu, among other areas (Epprecht, 2006). During the 1980s, though, 
unemployment rates among black Africans in the Pietermaritzburg area remained high, at 
approximately 30%; despite the fact that their preferential location meant that residents of 
Sobantu enjoyed substantially higher employment levels than did people in other 
communities, uprisings against the apartheid political system continued (Gwala, 1989). The 
city thus began encouraging more indiscriminate industrial development, almost doubling the 
number of factories during the latter half of the 1980s, resulting in “dramatic increases in 
pollution” (Epprecht, 2006: 4). 
 
Not unexpectedly, the first media reports of industrial pollution resulting in legal action by the 




written about water quality issues, compiled between 1980 and 2001 and housed at the 
Centre for Environment, Agriculture and Development at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, 
provided a detailed historical record of major water pollution incidents and the initiatives to 
address them. The following sections summarise what was reported with relevance to the 
Baynespruit, with additional commentary from other sources. Unfortunately the loss of key 
players, who have moved away or are otherwise no longer available, made it difficult to 
ascertain what became of some of the initiatives discussed. 
 
4.2.1 Documented Water Pollution 
On April 25, 1990, it was reported in the Natal Witness that the Department of Water Affairs 
(DWA) had charged Willowton Oil and Cake Mills with water pollution under Section 21 of 
the Water Act (Witness Reporter, 1990). On May 3, a follow-up report indicated that the 
company had been found guilty of having “unlawfully discharged effluent in excess of the 
permitted standard prescribed from its premises in July 1988”. A lawyer for the company 
stated that the problem had likely been the result of overflows due to a pump failure or 
severe storm, and that more than R 100 000 had since been spent on designing a new 
system. However, the prosecution noted that rainfall records did not indicate any storm 
activity at the time and that improvements made by the company had not yet been agreed by 
the DWA (Urquhart, 1990). Later that month, it was reported that Willowton Oil and Cake 
Mills’ discharge levels for chemical oxygen demand (COD) had been close to 4 000 
milligrams per litre (compared with a standard of 75), and levels for suspended matter had 
reached 598 (compared with a standard of 25). Furthermore, despite a fine of R 5 000, 
Umgeni Water suspected the company of continued pollution, and noted that the 
Baynespruit “has already lost almost all of its fish and plant life as a result of repeated 
pollution” (Weinberg, 1990: 3). 
 
Industrial pollution of the Baynespruit by the large oil and wax factories came to a head in 
the latter part of 1992. On September 24 and December 14 of that year, advocates for Sea 
Lake Industries were in court to defend against charges that the company failed to purify its 
water and industrial effluent prior to discharging it; COD readings in excess of 4 400 had 
been found in samples taken on February 21, 1991 (Amla, 1992a; Witness Reporter, 1992a). 
On December 2, following the dumping of “more than 10 tonnes of vegetable oil and soap 
waste [which] clogged up the Darvill Sewage Works”, it was reported that the city council 
had decided to seal off sewer access for any factories illegally dumping waste into the 
municipal sewerage system. Additionally, the DWA decided to issue both Sea Lake 
Industries and Willowton Oil and Cake Mills with water permits that would commit them to 




penalties of up to R 100 000 (Quinlan, 1992). Two weeks later, with no improvement having 
been found following monitoring of industrial effluent discharges, city council decided to brick 
up sewer access at Capital Oil Mills, Sea Lake Industries, and Willowton Oil and Cake Mills 
(Witness Reporter, 1992b). This was undertaken on December 18, but a couple of days later 
large quantities of effluent were discovered in the Baynespruit; the alleged source was Sea 
Lake Industries’ stormwater pipes, leading a city councillor to call for a consumer boycott of 
their products (Aitcheson, 1992). During this period, the DWA regional water quality 
manager went so far as to suggest that he could “apply to the Minister of Water Affairs to 
reduce or suspend the water supply to the factories” (Aitcheson & Hornby, 1992: 1). 
 
In July of 1993, it was alleged that Willowton Oil and Cake Mills had built a brick wall to 
connect their stormwater drain with the sewer system, thus allowing effluent to bypass 
Umgeni Water’s sampling point (Nichols, 1993). In November of that same year, at the 
ongoing trial of one of the directors of Sea Lake Industries, chemists from Umgeni Water 
testified that vegetable oil from the company had polluted the Baynespruit in both February 
and May of 1991 (Court Reporter, 1993). However, due to inadequacies in the sampling and 
analysis procedures followed during water testing undertaken at the time, both the company 
and its director were eventually acquitted (Witness Reporter, 1996a). An undated report 
noted that Capital Oil Mills had been charged with “unlawfully depositing unpurified industrial 
effluent containing high levels of oxygen, chemical oxygen and grease to be discharged via 
a stormwater drain into the [Baynespruit] in July 1993” (Anon, n.d.). A subsequent report in 
May of 1996 noted that the firm had paid an ‘admission of guilt’ fine of R 300 for having 
discharged oil directly into the sewer system the previous year (Witness Reporter, 1996b). 
This token amount was agreed because the company threatened to go into liquidation, and 
municipal officials were apparently less worried about environmental damage than about 
industrial closures or re-locations, which would create unemployment (Epprecht, 2006). 
Capital Oil Mills was back in the news less than a year later, when staff at Umgeni Water 
pinpointed the factory’s stormwater drain as the source of effluent discharged into the 
Baynespruit (Dell, 1997). The charges stemming from the 1993 pollution incident were 
eventually withdrawn after the company went into provisional liquidation in 1998 (Witness 
Reporter, 1998).  
 
On July 28, 1994, an article in the Witness reported yet another incident of industrial oil 
waste being illegally dumped into the sewer system (Pillay, 1994). Later that year, while a 
rail tanker was being offloaded at Capital Oil Mills, an accident resulted in some 5 000 litres 
of oil being spilled into the Baynespruit; while company employees managed to recover 




this, along with the resulting bacterial digestion which depletes oxygen levels, would result in 
a fish kill (Munusamy, 1994). After a period of relative quiet, Sea Lake Industries was back in 
the news in 1999 following a boiler explosion. The incident prompted media coverage 
documenting not only the company’s record of unsafe practices, but also its history of 
releasing industrial effluent into both the municipal sewer system and the Baynespruit 
(O’Grady, 1999). 
 
It was not only discharges from industry causing degradation of the Baynespruit, though. In 
November of 1991, Pietermaritzburg city council was warned of impending prosecution for 
failing to address frequent and significant faecal pollution of the uMsunduzi river, primarily 
caused by overflows from the Darvill treatment plant during heavy rain events; at the time, 
the contamination problems were attributed to stormwater infiltration into ageing sewers, 
illegal connections, blockages and informal settlement areas with inadequate sanitation 
(Grimbeek, 1991; Leftwich, 1991a). More than 15 years later, however, the DWAF is once 
again using the threat of prosecution under the NWA to push what is now the Msunduzi 
Municipality into dealing with polluted local rivers, including the Baynespruit. Problems 
continue to be blamed on blocked drains, leaky pipes, illegal structures and connections to 
the sewer system, and a lack of municipal sanitation and refuse collection service provision 
(Denny-Dimitriou, 2008a). Chief among the contributing factors are high rates of water 
infiltration into sewers; though an estimated 300 kilometres of old pipes are in need 
replacement, only two kilometres of the sewer network is replaced per year (Denny-Dimitriou, 
2008b). 
 
In late 1993, a senior scientist at Umgeni Water stated that industrial effluent and human 
sewage discharged into the Baynespruit had created “one of the most seriously polluted 
stretches of water in this part of Natal” (Quinlan, 1993: 1). With E. coli counts of close to 2 
million per 100 ml at times (compared with a health hazard threshold of 10 000) and a biotic 
index of between 0 and 5 (compared with 80 – 200 for healthy rivers), he described the 
water course as almost devoid of both oxygen and life; a spokesperson for the DWA said 
that they were working with Umgeni Water to identify the source of the pollution (Quinlan, 
1993). The next decade did not bring appreciable change, though. By 2001, Umgeni Water’s 
Annual Sustainability Report noted that “serious pollution incidents in the Baynespruit … has 
over the years resulted in the poor health status of the river. The Sobantu community has 
been mostly affected by this pollution as the high E. coli counts make the river unsafe for full 
contact recreation. Effluent discharges have also killed many fish and have resulted in 
blockage of the irrigation systems that the community use to irrigate their vegetable gardens” 





4.2.2 Past Education and Pollution Reduction Initiatives 
In the late 1980s, when industrial effluent discharges into the Baynespruit were first being 
reported, sewage pollution was being recognised as a major problem affecting the larger 
uMsunduzi catchment. At an April 5, 1991 symposium held by the Pietermaritzburg city 
council and Umgeni Water to address sewage pollution in the uMsunduzi river, community 
organisations – of which those in Sobantu were specifically mentioned – were encouraged to 
participate in making recommendations (Leftwich, 1991b). Later that year, the head of the 
Institute for Natural Resources (INR) was tasked by local government bodies and NGOs with 
forming a committee composed of representation from all interested parties to bring an end 
to pollution in the uMsunduzi and uMgeni catchments. They envisaged a forum through 
which people could voice concerns about development and resource conservation issues 
and receive practical environmental management assistance (Leftwich, 1991c). 
Unfortunately it is not known what, if anything, become of these initiatives. In late 1991, an 
organisation called the River Action Campaign (RAC) was formed by experts in water-
related fields from local government, parastatals and NGOs. Early the following year, the 
RAC began a programme to train community groups, schools and other interested parties on 
how to monitor water quality using basic kits to test for indicators such as acidity, dissolved 
oxygen and the presence of certain nymphs; they also encouraged groups to ‘adopt’ a 
particular section of a water course (Amla, 1992b; Banfield, 1992). The programme was 
apparently well-received, with a number of schools signing up for workshops (Witness 
Reporter, 1992c), but nothing further was reported and during this study it was not possible 
to find anyone who recalls the initiative. 
 
With regard to the Baynespruit in particular, despite the recognition of extreme levels of 
pollution throughout the 1990s, it was not until late in the decade that the problem received 
some specific attention. Epprecht (2006) suggests that this may have been due to lingering 
bitterness on the part of white municipal leaders, who were not inclined to tackle an 
environmental problem that only affected black African neighbourhoods – particularly those, 
like Sobantu, whose residents had exerted considerable political pressure prior to the fall of 
the apartheid regime. Whatever the reason, the first public protest was part of a Keep 
Pietermaritzburg Clean Association (KPCA) march held on September 14, 2001, at which 
members of the Sobantu Environmental Desk Network 96 (SEDN96) presented a 
memorandum to the mayor of Pietermaritzburg and a representative from the 
Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI). The memo noted that the 
ongoing pollution of the Baynespruit by certain industries in the WIA “has serious economic, 




the PCCI and its member industries to deal with the problem. While pointing out that not all 
industries located in the WIA were PCCI members, the PCCI representative promised a 
“swift response” (Witness Reporter, 2001a: 3). At a subsequent meeting held between the 
companies and other stakeholders by the PCCI environmental committee, representatives 
from industry agreed to ensure that their factories did not negatively affect the water course 
(Pole, 2002). It does not appear that any binding commitments were made, but this initiative 
may have been overtaken by the subsequent formation of the Baynespruit Task Team, 
described later in this section. 
 
In this same period during which attention was being focussed on the Baynespruit, a number 
of stakeholders, including SEDN96, the KPCA, and industries in the WIA, organised a 
Baynespruit Clean-up Campaign to address another issue of concern: garbage; it was held 
on November 29, 2001 (Witness Reporter, 2001b). Perhaps not surprisingly, during the 
clean-up participants came across an apparent case of active industrial pollution which 
Umgeni Water was called in to investigate. In response, a representative of Willowton Oil 
and Cake Mills insisted that “the few industries that continue to act recklessly and pollute the 
Baynespruit … rectify the situation immediately” and that the authorities “ensure that the 
offending industries be ruthlessly pursued in order to clean up their acts”. He also promised 
“the people of Sobantu Village that we will make every effort to ensure that our stretch [of the 
Baynespruit] is kept clean” (Witness Reporter, 2001b: 3).  
 
Also as a result of a SEDN96 appeal, the Msunduzi Catchment Management Forum 
(MCMF) proposed the establishment of the Baynespruit Task Team (BTT) in 2001 (Pole, 
2002). The goal was to identify illegal discharges and trace them back to specific firms (Pole, 
2008). However this undertaking was (and is) especially complicated in the WIA, where an 
interconnected network of sewer and stormwater pipes makes identifying sources of illegal 
discharges difficult (Epprecht, 2006; Pole, 2002). At the municipality’s behest, 
representatives from industry were included on the BTT, which meant that “the investigated 
thus became part of the team of investigators” (Pole, 2008). Nonetheless, according to 
numerous participants, from industry to local residents, the BTT was successful in 
eliminating industrial discharges for a period of several months. Unfortunately, with the 
problem ‘solved’ the pressure relented, the Task Team became inactive, and discharges of 
industrial effluent into the Baynespruit soon resumed. 
 
To understand why none of these initiatives achieved lasting success, one might begin by 
examining the stakeholders involved, the stated goals of the efforts and the difficulties they 




guided by government and parastatals, particularly at the local level. NGOs, in the form of 
residents’ groups and other associations of concerned citizens and specialists, were also 
responsible for instigating and carrying out awareness-raising and remediation. While 
industry does not appear to have led any of the endeavours, their representatives, and in 
some cases staff, took part. In addition, the goals of each initiative, be they awareness-
raising or pollution reduction, were fairly clearly stated. However, with the possible exception 
of the BTT, stakeholders do not appear to have engaged in a participatory process to jointly 
negotiate long-term solutions. In fact, some stakeholders do not appear to have had any 
involvement beyond the identification of the problem (such as SEDN96’s memorandum), or 
one-time participation (such as the factory employees and local residents who removed litter 
as part of the Clean-up Campaign). Residents of Sobantu in particular seem to have been 
excluded from any direct negotiation and subsequent activity, in some cases just hoping that 
highlighting the issue would bring change. Comments such as those of the following three 
respondents illustrate this: 
 
“… we had a march and there was no response … we were so many … we got placards and 
went with schoolchildren down to City Hall. They promised to [look into the matter], but we 
didn’t see anything.” 
 
“… we thought the councillor would speak to the factories and we thought the factories 
would respond by not polluting” 
 
“We got comments in the newspaper, but there was no response from the municipality. 
There were some fines, but we were not informed about them.” 
 
In some cases partnerships among stakeholders were developed, such as the one between 
the SEAF and the INR during the establishment of small-scale agricultural plots near 
Sobantu, but communication remained problematic. According to one member of the SEAF, 
the INR produced a report that identified the sources of the effluent discharges that were 
preventing the use of water from the Baynespruit for irrigation, but the SEAF never received 
a copy. Though changes in community leadership since that time make it difficult to 
determine, part of the impetus for the formation of the SEAF may have been communication 
breakdown within Sobantu’s own (at that time diverse) network of environment-focussed 
groups. Without feedback, residents and leaders who were concerned about the issues 
would not have been able to continue to focus public and political attention. 
 
The BTT, which had participation from the DWAF, Msunduzi Municipality, Umgeni Water, 
industries and the community – and benefitted from funding from an overseas NGO – came 
closest to being a participatory process. Ghai and Vivian (1992: 10) emphasised “the 




the critical role played by technical knowledge [and] participatory research … in 
understanding and finding solutions to environmental problems.” Indeed, the BTT enjoyed 
what one industry representative felt had been “open communication” among the varied 
stakeholders, as industries were shown the effects of effluent pollution on the ecosystem 
and downstream communities, and the authorities stepped up their monitoring activities. 
While this does not quite equate with participatory learning, a representative from Umgeni 
Water judged that some companies did make lasting improvements. Others did not change, 
though, and ultimately the BTT foundered. According to two industry representatives who sat 
on the Task Team: 
 
“I don’t think the goals were met … it just fell away eventually because there was a lack of 
commitment from other stakeholders.” 
 
“The Baynespruit had actually recuperated, but it didn’t last long. The committee stopped 
meeting and there was no more action.” 
 
The key ingredient which, by its absence, prevented the BTT from being a truly participatory 
process was the lack of any redistribution of power among stakeholders. The community of 
Sobantu does not appear to have wielded any ability to influence, much less control, 
decision-making and outcomes, and no other interested and affected parties (such as NGOs 
or other downstream users) were represented. However, the short-term success of the 
increased monitoring and response to pollution incidents by Umgeni Water and the 
municipality during the period in which the BTT was active indicates that this is a key 
component in motivating industry. Eventually, many of the BTT’s members became part of 
the MCMF; as has been noted previously, though, this forum has little representation from 
industry. Regrettably, the ultimate failure of any of these initiatives to bring about lasting 
change was a significant discouragement to local residents. As one member of the SEAF 
lamented: 
 
“ … all the campaigns and talking to the factories were in vain, because they carried on 
polluting” 
 
4.3 Stakeholders’ views of the problem 
To determine how the diverse stakeholder groups would approach a multi-stakeholder 
process, it was critical to begin by understanding what they saw as the major pollution issues 
and their effects, and the importance they attached to these problems. In general, 
respondents identified industrial pollution as being the most significant problem, and the 
impact of pollution on human health as the greatest concern. Otherwise there was 
substantial variation among, though not as much within, the stakeholder groups. Local 




greater value on clean and healthy water courses than did industry representatives, noting, 
for example: 
 
“In certain parts of the catchment, [riparian areas are] the only green space left” 
 
“The environment is the foundation … water plays a vital role in everyone’s lives, so that’s 
why the Baynespruit is a major concern.” 
 
Predictably, local residents and NGO representatives who interact most closely with the 
stream felt the effects of pollution most keenly. Perhaps this accounts for the fact that all the 
local residents interviewed used to word “dirty” to describe the stream, while only one other 
stakeholder did. The following is a representative statement: 
 
“The river water is dirty, fish are dying … it’s dangerous to go into the water because of the 
cans, pollution, etc. [Contamination from informal] settlements [has] made the water very 
unhealthy.” 
 
With regard to responsibility, attitudes varied widely among stakeholders. Agency staff 
largely felt a duty to contribute as much as possible to finding solutions, viewing it as part of 
their job and role in the community. Local residents tended to view themselves as victims of 
externally-generated pollution, though they acknowledged their own community’s role in 
exacerbating the garbage problem. Nonetheless, many were willing to accept some 
responsibility for assisting with pollution reduction. On the other hand, industrial 
representatives generally felt that the problems should be addressed by local government. 
They did not see themselves as deriving any benefit from the stream, and some did not feel 
any custodial connection to it at all. When asked whether or not he was concerned about the 
fate of the Baynespruit, one respondent said that he was no more concerned with the state 
of the stream than with the condition of the local road. Municipal staff members are 
apparently aware of such attitudes, with one noting that: 
 
“There seems to be no recognition from industry as to the importance of these [riparian] 
systems.” 
 
4.3.1 Local Residents and NGOs 
All residents of Sobantu reported that the stream was part of their daily lives in some way. 
Farmers and those tending vegetable gardens were most connected with the stream, and 
had a detailed knowledge of the pollution issues, as did the representative of the NGO 
DUCT, who was not a local resident. While all subjects identified the industries as a major 
cause of water pollution, most also recognised sewage contamination and the dumping of 
garbage as important issues; one resident felt that the sewer surcharges had actually 




people living in Sobantu and neighbouring communities use the river or the floodplain to 
dispose of their rubbish if they miss the weekly collection, or if they can not afford plastic 
bags for disposal. One respondent pointed out that there are also vehicle maintenance 
garages in the area that dump used oil and other waste products into the Baynespruit. The 
DUCT representative also mentioned the infestation of alien invasive plants. 
 
All respondents were concerned about the effects of the various sources of pollution on 
human health in general, and some residents specifically questioned the impacts of using 
water from the Baynespruit to irrigate produce, which is consumed both by those who grow it 
and by other local residents who buy it. It is a concern shared by many in the developing 
world: some 200 million people living in urban areas, especially in Africa and Asia, eat 
produce grown locally using untreated waste water (Anon, 2008). One subject noted that 
many in the community are living with illnesses such as HIV/AIDS, so their health is already 
compromised. For members of the DUCT (many of whom make use of the uMsunduzi river 
downstream of its confluence with the Baynespruit for paddling) health, particularly from the 
perspective of high E. coli counts, was a major concern. Most residents also mentioned 
issues of recreation, with children either no longer able to swim in the river, or risking their 
health by doing so. Food security was raised, both in terms of fishing, which is no longer 
possible, and agriculture. Local food security had been a focus of the original small-scale 
farming Co-op begun in the 1990s, but one respondent reported that since 2005, when 
farmers suspended all use of water from the Baynespruit (which they had been gradually 
forced to reduce due to pollution), they have been unable to cultivate more than half their 
allotments due to a lack of water. One community representative noted that this problem 
also affects a similar agricultural project in nearby Eastwood. Despite the many impacts, 
effluent and sewage pollution events are not continuous but sporadic, which may account for 
the respondents who were concerned that many community members are not aware of the 
hazards posed by the use of water from the Baynespruit for things such as recreation and 
irrigation. Finally, the gradual social degeneration which results when natural areas become 
degraded was pointed out by two respondents. The following comments capture residents’ 
and NGO members’ views on pollution and its effects: 
 
“[We] depend on the cleanliness of that river, that is why I’m very concerned” 
 
“It’s dirty … they put everything [in the Baynespruit] - oil, plastic, urine, bottles …” 
 
 “ … a young boy swam in the river and his skin became dry and damaged with spots” 
 
“ … when people come to buy [vegetables such as spinach and beetroot], they see the river 





“Community food security is badly affected because they used to fish there …” 
 
“ … people retreat when public spaces become degraded … It starts with weeds, then 
comes rubbish, then criminals start hanging out there.” 
 
One of the most interesting commonalities was that most people interviewed had been 
raised in the community and talked about the changes in the Baynespruit over the years, 
something not noted among the other stakeholder groups who did not have an equally long-
term association with the stream. Local residents were thus the only ones to speak of the 
stream as the healthy ecosystem it used to be a generation ago; agency and industry 
stakeholders apparently have no recollection of this. Two long-time residents expressed it 
this way: 
 
“ …it used to be a recreation area, we used to go there in summer for swimming … we used 
to go fishing for sport and in summer for food when there were big fish. There was bird life 
as well …” 
 
“ … the value of the stream for fish, swimming, to look at a beautiful river running - that is 
gone now.” 
 
With respect to how they would begin addressing the pollution problems, most residents 
expressed a preference for some kind of multi-stakeholder forum. They felt the only possible 
approach was to have representatives from the factories and the communities along the 
stream sit down together with officials from the municipality and discuss the effects of the 
pollution and try to understand each other’s problems. It must be noted that this majority 
view does not stem from a particular faith in the participatory process, but rather from having 
exhausted all other options. Though one resident held a dissenting view, saying that the 
community would come together to fight and perhaps take the factories to court again, most 
realised that strategies such as protests, one-off media attention and legal action had not 
brought about significant and lasting change in the past. They expressed a preference for 
dialogue, backed up by close monitoring: 
 
“… I can see that the law cannot solve these problems” 
 
“Previously we tried strategies like picketing, but now we want to try a multi-stakeholder 
forum, and also form a monitoring group to make it easy to pick up the problems.” 
 
“The best thing may be to invite the factory owners to come to Sobantu and … discuss the 
effects on the people who use that water.” 
 
Perhaps due to a greater sense of empowerment and a shorter history of engagement and 




potential for the use of proactive, coordinated action and publicity in putting pressure on all 
parties to act, saying: 
 
“We need to start doing something ourselves … The public [must] express mounting concern, 
which would lead to coordinated private actions, which would then leverage municipal 
actions to be stricter on pollution, dumping, etc.” 
 
4.3.2 Industry 
The most striking comment, made by all respondents from industry, was that their firms 
derived no benefit from the Baynespruit, despite the fact that all sites had stormwater drains 
which emptied into the stream and many employed people who lived downstream. This 
perception may be due to the fact that industries in the WIA do not extract water from the 
stream, but use the municipal supply. Two industry representatives admitted to never having 
actually visited the stream. The following comments summarised the lack of connection: 
 
“It’s not a priority issue … we only have a stormwater drain.” 
 
“We don’t hear anything from them [the community] … They [impacts of pollution] don’t 
affect us.” 
 
“ ...people in Sobantu draw their water directly from the stream, so we’re affecting people 
downstream. [Industries] don’t seem to realize that.” 
 
Most did, however, express general concern for the state of the stream, from an ecological 
as well as a human health perspective. Two respondents made specific mention of their 
companies’ concern for the quality of the stormwater they discharge, and the measures they 
have in place to ensure that effluent does not pollute the stream. Interestingly, knowledge of 
the stream and its problems was considerably higher among representatives of the edible oil 
companies – which are typically regarded as the main sources of effluent pollution – than 
among other companies’ respondents. This was likely influenced in part by the fact that 
those interviewed at the edible oil companies had worked for their companies for 
considerably longer than the majority of those interviewed at other firms, but perhaps also as 
a consequence of their long history of interaction with the authorities regarding pollution. 
One respondent tactfully put it thus: 
 
“We’ve been dealing with the stream, disposal of liquid waste, for quite some time with the 
municipality.” 
 
In general, industry representatives identified industrial effluent as the main problem 
affecting the Baynespruit, followed by garbage (both household and industrial); only one 
respondent mentioned sewage as a concern. The most common suggestions they made on 




effluent, along with more stringent enforcement of the law, as well as education for residents 
regarding pollution issues. With respect to who needs to be involved in contending with 
pollution, company representatives named themselves and other industries along with 
government agencies, including the municipality; most also included residents. The following 
comments summarise the most widely-held views: 
 
“Social responsibility on the part of the businesses along the river … [and] education of the 
residents would also go a long way to solving the problem.” 
 
“The municipality and Umgeni Water also don’t take the initiative to monitor industries … We 
need more stringent [enforcement].” 
 
“Obviously the community need to be there, industry in the area, a regulatory body like 
DWAF or Umgeni Water, the municipality …” 
 
4.3.3 Regulatory Agencies and Parastatals 
Knowledge of the stream and the problems affecting it among staff at regulatory agencies 
and parastatals was high. This stakeholder group also had the most holistic view of the 
water course as part of larger ecological and human systems. All respondents expressed 
considerable concern for the pollution in the Baynespruit, and most of the local government 
and parastatal agencies’ staff members specifically mentioned taking a personal interest in 
its condition. This may be due in part to the fact that many of these respondents are the 
ones taking calls from frustrated members of the public who want pollution problems dealt 
with. According to one: 
 
“I want to know that I’ve done my best … I become labelled as not doing enough, so it’s 
important to me that we solve these issues.” 
 
The representatives from regulatory agencies and parastatals identified illegal industrial 
discharges as the most problematic contributing factors, but also pointed the finger at 
residential sources of pollution, lack of service provision to settlements, ageing sewer 
infrastructure, population increases and greater density, and misuse of the sewer network 
resulting in blockages and surcharges. Human health was chief among the impacts 
recognised, but respondents also mentioned environmental health, erosion, damage to 
infrastructure, the creation of conditions under which pests such as mosquitoes, rats and 
cockroaches flourish, unpleasant smells, and problems for downstream users both small and 
large. Typical comments included the following: 
 
“It affects the fauna and flora on the banks [and] water quality … it feeds into the Duzi which 
is also impacted … downstream it feeds into other dams, [which] causes problems when 





“Clearly it’s a health issue primarily, but it goes beyond that. It affects livelihoods, 
unemployment levels are high and … people are being denied [the] opportunity [to] … 
undertake urban agriculture [to make] an income, and [to access] fresh vegetables.” 
 
Agency staff members were encouraged by progress, whether it was better maintenance of 
infrastructure or building capacity among residents. However, they noted that much still 
needed to be done. Given their comprehensive understanding of the Baynespruit system 
and the sources and effects of pollution, respondents were surprisingly narrow in their 
suggested solutions. Most recommended education and awareness-raising for residents, 
and some felt that industry should also be approached in this way. A number of respondents 
said that more resources would be required, whether to maintain and replace infrastructure, 
increase monitoring, carry out community capacity-building or take legal action. One 
municipal representative’s experience was that the most effective approach was to make an 
example of one offender, and then wield the threat of prosecution to spur others into action: 
 
“You need to put money, resources and expertise into prosecution – support and dialogue 
will not be encouraged until someone has been smacked.” 
 
Only two respondents mentioned involving the full range of stakeholders in finding solutions, 
from regulatory agencies to community leaders, heads of industry and relevant specialists. 
Both expressed quite practical views, but one arrived at this opinion after years of 
disappointment: 
 
“Decision-makers definitely need to be involved …” 
 
“Policing daily won’t help [due to] corruption, applying the law doesn’t work, so it must be 
more voluntary, people must communicate [with the polluters].” 
 
4.4 Barriers to Participation 
Though an apparent lack of forthrightness from industry representatives undoubtedly 
hindered the analysis, economic barriers seemed to play a dominant role across all 
stakeholder groups. Other barriers to participation differed among categories, with situational 
barriers of greater importance to industry as well as regulatory agencies and parastatals, 
while developmental and socio-cultural factors were more significant for local residents and 
NGO members. The majority of respondents from all stakeholder groups would limit their 
involvement if a participatory process was not producing results and fellow stakeholders 
were uncooperative. The following comment summarises this attitude: 
 
“If there were no clear targets and objectives, if it degenerated into a talk shop, a blaming 






Another commonality was that all stakeholders tended to think at a very local level, which is 
not particularly surprising given the current regulatory framework. Other than the 
respondents from Umgeni Water and the DUCT, who are concerned with water quality in the 
entire uMsunduzi-uMngeni watershed, none of the interview subjects seemed to look beyond 
the immediate Baynespruit system boundaries. Only two respondents – both agency staff 
members – mentioned CMAs, but if and when they are implemented regionally, stakeholders 
will be forced to think about the issues on a larger scale. This will be particularly true with 
regard to downstream impacts, likely an unwelcome change for industry, but a possible 
benefit to local residents and NGOs. A related barrier discouraging proactive residents and 
industry representatives was the lack of response from authorities, resulting in a loss of faith 
in their ability to carry out their duties. The following comments were made by industry 
representatives and a local resident:  
 
“We don’t get any information about the condition of the stream … even though we’re right 
here.” 
  
“ … most of the time when we complain, nothing happens, there’s no action.” 
 
“What bothers me is getting no response from the authorities when you actually see an 
incident.” 
 
While monitoring and enforcement are unquestionably the obligation of the regulatory 
agencies, other stakeholders – for a variety of reasons which are further examined in 
subsequent sections – have a tendency to thrust all responsibility for action onto them. This 
was on display at the inaugural meeting of the Baynespruit Conservancy, at which the Chair 
of the DUCT had to remind the audience of the importance of being proactive. As one 
municipal staff member who was interviewed pointed out: 
 
“[Some] are suggesting that the municipality should be the one dealing with the problem, but 
the river is the responsibility of everyone who lives on its banks.” 
 
4.4.1 Local Residents and NGOs 
It was anticipated that a variety of developmental, situational and socio-cultural factors would 
prevent participation on the part of residents of Sobantu and members of NGOs. Such 
barriers could range from a lack of knowledge and empowerment, to meetings held at 
inaccessible locations or inconvenient times (for example, during the work day). However, 
though one respondent mentioned that evening meetings were difficult as everyone was 
tired by then, situational barriers appeared to play a negligible role. While Griffin (1999), 
Negra (1998) and Wandersman et al. (1987) all found lack of time to be a significant barrier 




not a factor mentioned by local residents. Nonetheless, respondents were not willing to 
devote time to initiatives that failed to make progress and lead to action, as found by Griffin 
(1999), Prestby et al. (1990) and Wandersman et al. (1987) and demonstrated in these 
responses: 
 
“If I don’t get data and information [feedback] from participation, it’s useless … Also, if I don’t 
see action plans in place, then what’s the use?” 
 
“If it’s going to be a talk-shop, then no [I wouldn’t participate].” 
 
Though financial considerations are rarely raised in the literature, they proved to be a 
significant barrier for the residents and NGOs interviewed. The most common concern 
among residents was a lack of transportation to attend meetings, while for the DUCT it was a 
lack of staff – both issues which come down to economics. Part of the problem appears to 
stem from the lack of a ‘culture of volunteerism’ in South Africa, with people either expecting 
to be paid for their time or to receive some material reward: this was made abundantly clear 
during the DUCT’s Community River Care Day, at which most participants were either 
company employees, or were anticipating a T-shirt and a free meal in return for a morning’s 
work helping to clean up litter along local water courses. While Everatt et al. (2005: 284-5) 
found that 17% of South Africans volunteered their time, with black Africans and Indians 
much more likely than coloureds and whites to do so, they noted that a large proportion of 
giving consisted of "informal social caring and neighborly support [through] HIV/AIDS home-
based care initiatives, stokvels, and burial societies", causes which often involve extended 
family or direct self-interest. In the event that citizens do wish to implement improvement 
projects of their own initiative, though, economic resources still present a barrier. A local 
resident and an elected official described both situations in their comments: 
 
“ … if you get no profit, it’s discouraging … so I need some money [for transport and time]” 
 
“The main thing that stops people is financial constraints. They have a bright idea, but how 
do you put it forward … [for example, they lack] money for brush-cutters, bags for garbage 
clean-up … It’s discouraging to people … as time goes on, you give up.” 
 
As the DUCT representative points out, though, if citizens are committed to working toward 
change, action can be facilitated: 
 
“There is funding out there that’s not being accessed … We could link [stakeholders] with 
other initiatives, funding, etc.” 
 
In essence, then, the DUCT has knowledge of projects and sources of funding which local 




‘structural inequalities’. Prestby et al. (1990: 146) suggest that government agencies, 
foundations and other organisations should be instrumental in decreasing the “inhibiting 
costs of participation”, which may include not only material goods such as the supplies 
mentioned by the municipal official, but also “information, training resources, and public 
recognition”. In order for them to do so, they must be made aware of affected communities 
and their needs, and this is where networking becomes so important. As one official pointed 
out, “you need a good communicator to tap community outreach funding”. In reality the 
SEAF has already begun to benefit from the opportunities that making contacts can afford, in 
one case through resources accessed via members’ participation in the MCMF. 
 
Several respondents also pointed to developmental barriers, generally a lack of knowledge 
and skills, as something that could prevent them from participating. The Global Water 
Partnership (2000) suggests that governments take responsibility for providing education, 
reliable information and confidence-building mechanisms, especially for marginalised 
individuals, in order to facilitate and enhance stakeholders’ ability to participate. In fact, 
training, including leadership development, has been used extensively in India to assist 
women and low-caste representatives (Gaventa & Valderrama, 1999). However, when 
government is not willing or able, networking may again assist local residents in getting 
access to suitable information and training. In Ecuador, successful grassroots organisations 
were found to have been supported by NGOs, churches and fellow community-based groups 
(Mitlin, 2004). In the case of formal processes, if capacity-building is seen as one of the aims 
of participation – as envisaged by Beierle and Cayford (2002), for example – then this 
developmental barrier should in fact be recognised at the outset and approached as an 
opportunity. After all, “the learning process can instill confidence and ultimately 
empowerment” (Servaes & Arnst, 1999: 124). However, for this to be successful the 
perceived experts must avoid being condescending, stifling innovative thinking, or providing 
insufficient information and/or training to allow participants to address the issue at hand – all 
problems documented by Arnstein (1969). Though one Canadian study found that it could 
take several years for lay citizens to gain the confidence and abilities required to make 
decisions about complex topics such as health care, it was certainly possible for them to do 
so (Singer, 1995). "Provided citizens are given a conducive and supportive structure for 
discourse, they are able to understand and process technical information and to articulate 
well-balanced recommendations” (Renn et al., 1993: 209). One agency staff member felt 
that developing knowledge and skills among local residents was vital in the case of pollution 





“… community members [need to be involved], to be given the information and means … so 
they can know enough to report problems and be a part of the solution” 
 
“I think it would help us to get a group to be trained to inspect the water, I think university 
students who are doing work on the environment [could] come and help us, I think that will 
play a big role in bringing ideas of how to go about cleaning the river.” 
 
Even just raising awareness about the problems and impacts can begin to change attitudes. 
One long-time resident described the following process of awakening in the early 1990s: 
  
“[As workers in a nearby carpentry shop], we saw the river change colour every day, we said 
it was none of our business. When the Sobantu [environmental] organisation started, they 
heard about the pollution and thought it should be clean.” 
 
One of the major barriers to citizen participation discussed in the literature is a lack of 
empowerment, especially among the disadvantaged. As one resident of Sobantu stated at 
an initial meeting between the DUCT and the SEAF to discuss the Baynespruit, “It looks like 
we are powerless”. In their case, this may be compounded by the legacy of learned 
dependency examined by Servaes and Arnst (1999), in which solutions are expected to 
come from outsiders, as they often did during the apartheid era, for example. While residents 
may be willing to contribute, they apparently lack the confidence to instigate measures 
themselves. Ethnicity, gender and class may also contribute to power imbalances (Berkes, 
2004); at the inaugural meeting of the Baynespruit Conservancy, despite an overwhelming 
majority of attendees being residents of Sobantu, only three contributed to the discussion, 
while half a dozen agency and industry representatives (all white or Indian males) dominated 
the proceedings. One must be cautious about ascribing this reticence to speak in front of a 
large group solely to demographic factors, however. It is possible that residents, whose first 
language is isiZulu, were not able to fully understand the discussion, which was held in 
English and exacerbated by noise and poor acoustics: this same problem was encountered 
by members of the SEAF when a subsequent meeting of the MCMF was held in the same 
venue. Perhaps more importantly, as Lozare (1994) points out, merely providing previously 
disempowered individuals with the chance to contribute to decision-making does not mean 
that they will be able to take advantage of this opportunity, as empowerment is not only a 
requirement but also an outcome of participation. When residents do take advantage of an 
opportunity to make their voice heard, though, they may find themselves marginalised. The 
following comments highlight these various problems: 
 
“We wait for people to do something for us.” 
 
“I’ll be happy if a campaign or NGO can participate in cleaning the river, maybe that would 





“With politicians, if they don’t know you they may not listen.” 
 
“Sometimes [municipal] staff don’t attend the committee meetings [in Sobantu], as they don’t 
think it’s important.” 
 
“I know most of those factory owners … [but] when I asked them for some donations, they 
said they needed to have a meeting, but then they didn’t turn up.” 
 
One way for citizens, especially those who are disadvantaged, to overcome power inequities 
is to build partnerships in order to learn effective advocacy and gain access to resources 
(Cornwall, 2004; Gaventa & Valderrama, 1999). Vivian (1992: 70) listed the “ability to form a 
coalition with regional, national or international groups which have similar interests, and to 
publicize their grievances and their cause” as one of the key characteristics of successful 
environmental activism. Mitlin (2004) sees an even broader role for what she calls national 
and international ‘federating’ among local groups, including developing members’ knowledge, 
skills and confidence, learning what has worked elsewhere, and mobilising political pressure. 
In addition, Hamann and Acutt (2003) suggest that citizens strengthen their position by 
informing themselves about all the options available to them, including legal action, before 
they agree to negotiations. If one does not recognise the effectiveness or know how to make 
use of strategies such as press coverage, consumer pressure, or partnering with larger 
NGOs, it is not possible to exploit them. Some community members do in fact seem aware 
of the potential political power they could leverage, but do not appear to have taken full 
advantage of it: 
 
“A lot of people [in Sobantu] are working in the factories [that discharge effluent in the 
WIA], … they need to talk to them [employers].” 
 
“I don’t think as one person I can influence decisions, but if we have the masses, we have a 
stronger voice.” 
 
As Wheeler (1999) points out, though, unskilled employees in particular put themselves at 
risk when approaching their companies’ management, as they may have limited job options, 
and high unemployment means that others are only too willing to replace them. Organising 
willing co-workers to present a united front, using a non-confrontational approach, and taking 
action as part of a larger campaign can minimise such risks. Egger and Majeres (1992) 
stress the importance of coming together to push for common interests such as the 
enforcement of existing legislation and the creation of new policies. Overall, the general level 
of empowerment ranged from minimal to moderate among residents of Sobantu, but none 
were as confident in their ability to influence the decision-making process as the DUCT 





“… lobbying, attending meetings, seeing people, writing letters, talking to council, [and] 
making people aware of the problems.” 
 
Finally, other socio-cultural barriers mentioned by local residents and NGO members related 
to the nature of the participatory environment, including the group dynamics cited by Prestby 
et al. (1990) and Wandersman et al. (1987), in addition to the importance of the perception 
of fairness noted by Smith and McDonough (2001). 
“I need someone to encourage me to carry on, so I won’t give up.” 
 
“If no one else is willing to help carry the load, it would drain us and we can’t afford that. We 
want local stakeholders to take the initiative.” 
 
“… if I think there’s bribery or corruption that would prevent me [from participating]” 
 
Local residents and NGOs are thus affected by all four categories of barriers. The particular 












Figure 4.1: Economic, situational, developmental and socio-cultural barriers facing local 
residents and NGO members. 
 
Overall, the barriers to participation among residents of Sobantu and members of NGOs 
interviewed as part of this study differed somewhat from initial expectations. As summarised 
in Figure 4.1, economic factors played a larger role than anticipated, while situational 
barriers were less significant. Developmental impediments also existed, but were 
overshadowed by socio-cultural barriers, particularly a lack of empowerment. Fortunately, all 
of these barriers can be addressed, at least to some degree, by building relationships and 
contacts in order to facilitate access to both tangible and intangible resources. 
 
Socio-cultural 
• lack of empowerment 
• learned dependency 
• vulnerability 
Economic 
• lack of funds 
• lack of supplies 
Situational 
• lack of information / networks 
• lack of time / transport 
• lack of progress 
Developmental 
• lack of knowledge / skills 





For industry, the expectation was that economic and situational barriers, the latter primarily 
in the form of resistance to change, would play the largest role in determining participation in 
pollution reduction initiatives. Unfortunately, despite the guarantee of anonymity, discussions 
with other knowledgeable stakeholders and field observations indicated that some 
respondents may not have been completely forthright during the interviews. In fact, the most 
telling comment with regard to economic barriers came not from an industry representative, 
but from a regulatory agency staff member who had tried to work cooperatively with 
industries in the WIA: 
 
“ … compliance [with trade effluent by-laws] would involve capital injection, and arguments 
happened. So [although] we gave them advice and told them how to go about it … the 
money factor to initiate the controls was the stumbling block.” 
 
Notwithstanding the lack of candour from respondents, which in itself presents a barrier to 
constructive participation, some informative observations may be made. While it was difficult 
to asses an entire company’s approach to organisational change over the course of a single 
interview with one representative, certain statements were indicative. For example, one 
company claimed to have dealt with their effluent discharge problems by halting the process 
responsible for its generation, not a particularly innovative solution. Those companies that 
had, or were working toward, VEAs such as ISO 14000 certification seemed somewhat more 
proactive in their approach to environmental challenges. Two such respondents replied that: 
 
“We first look at environmental impacts for new products … from a health and safety as well 
as an environmental point of view … We [also] look for alternatives.” 
 
“We try to run an environmentally responsible programme … we salvage and re-use 
excess.” 
 
Some respondents also cited situational barriers, such as the timing of meetings, which 
could prevent them from participating, while others mentioned a lack of action or progress 
toward stated goals as a barrier to participation. 
 
“More talking and less doing is pointless … [we] must have … action” 
 
“[If] whatever measures are put in place are not enforced … if there’s no improvement 
because other stakeholders are not doing their part [it could prevent our participation].” 
 
Most responded positively to the idea of a multi-stakeholder forum, though, with the following 
comments being typical:  
 
“Community is a big part of what we do, so if it’s something we could contribute to, then by 




“If there was a clean-up day, we could budget funds, make resources available.” 
 
However, despite their statements, these respondents – along with the majority of the two 
dozen industries contacted with regard to participating in the Baynespruit Conservancy – did 
not attend the brief inaugural meeting or take advantage of the invitation to participate in the 
DUCT-organised Community River Care Day clean-up. There are a number of possible 
reasons for this. For those industries that are not generally thought of as polluters, it may be 
a simple lack of recognition that environmental health and justice issues are part of their 
corporate mandate (Hamann & Acutt, 2003). Despite their proximity to the stream, their 
stormwater discharge pipes and, in many cases, their employees being downstream 
residents, many industry representatives displayed a decided lack of concern for the 
Baynespruit. Others put the onus on regulatory agencies, or implied that water quality would 
not matter as much if people were not making direct use of it. Companies in the WIA are 
certainly not alone in adopting the former stance: no less a figure than billionaire American 
investor Warren Buffet dismissed native protesters alleging environmental degradation by 
one of his companies, “saying the issue was for regulators to resolve” (Clark, 2008: 42). The 
following statements capture the range of sentiments expressed: 
 
“I would have to be convinced that the Baynespruit was my problem [before getting 
involved].” 
 
“Whether we contribute to pollution or not … whether or not we have a major impact on the 
problem [is a factor].” 
 
“For the residents it’s a big issue, I’d hate to live on the banks of a polluted river. But there 
are so many concerns, like poor roads … we can’t just focus on the river.” 
 
“If the informal settlement wasn’t there, people would not be drawing water directly.” 
 
 “… the local municipality should initiate the [clean-up] programme – they have funding 
through taxpayers’ money.” 
 
“If Umgeni Water is not screaming, then things must be getting better.” 
 
When asked how the company keeps abreast of issues affecting the local communities, one 
respondent whose employees did not live in the area said simply, “It doesn’t affect us”. 
These companies seem to be searching for reasons to avoid getting involved. Some 
industries in the WIA actively resist engagement by regulatory agencies, let alone other 
stakeholders (MCMF, 2007). This may be done to avoid being blamed for pollution problems, 
and having to shoulder the consequences of taking responsibility, such as being asked to 
make commitments. Borrini-Feyerabend et al. (2004: 61) note that “a powerful way to 




discussion to happen". More passively, such companies may simply be deterred from 
sending a representative to attend any gathering addressing the problems. The following 
comment from one resident of Sobantu made it clear why: “We’re going to fight until we have 
them [the factories]”. While such attitudes are clearly not conducive to productive dialogue 
among stakeholders, continued lack of engagement by industry is only likely to worsen 
relations.  
 
Another disincentive to participation, discussed by Afsah et al. (1997), is the lack of 
enforcement. Companies may threaten bankruptcy or relocation to obtain leniency, 
regulatory agencies may not have the resources required to carry out rigorous monitoring, 
corruption may allow companies to avoid penalties, and unsuccessful prosecutions may lead 
to an unwillingness on the part of regulatory agencies to litigate in the future. All of the 
foregoing have been factors in the WIA (Pole, 2002). If there is no threat of being caught 
and/or prosecuted, companies have no motivation to change. A municipal official highlighted 
the problem thus: 
 
“Enforcement is difficult because you can’t catch the culprit … they [factories] discharge 
[effluent] at night.” 
 
Should industries indeed be involved in any form of corruption, the transparency required by 
participation would be a further barrier (Wang et al., 2004). A similar, though not illegal, 
phenomenon which is also anathema to transparency is what Bansal and Roth (2000) called 
‘field cohesion’, in which firms in heavily-scrutinised industries, such as petro-chemical 
companies, tend to stick together. With four of South Africa’s 17 edible oil refineries located 
in Pietermaritzburg (Pillay, 1994) a level of field cohesion was expected. Interestingly, 
though, the opposite proved to be the case: not only was there no loyalty between 
companies, but in one case there was actually finger-pointing. The overall importance of the 














Figure 4.2: Economic, situational and socio-cultural barriers facing industry. 
 
On the whole, while certain purely logistical barriers were mentioned, resistance to change 
(both in the status quo and in organisational terms) as well as little threat of enforcement, 
combined both economic and situational elements. As predicted, developmental and socio-
cultural barriers were of limited importance. 
 
4.4.3 Regulatory Agencies and Parastatals 
Based on the literature, the prediction for regulatory agencies and parastatals was that 
economic, situational and to some extent socio-cultural barriers would limit participation in 
reducing pollution. Indeed, a lack of resources, principally staff time and equipment, was 
cited by every respondent. Two also cited a lack of support from management-level 
decision-makers as limiting their efforts to contribute, and another noted that agencies are 
reluctant to participate unless other stakeholders take equal responsibility. Typical 
comments included the following: 
 
“To participate effectively, we ... have to have more resources ... we can’t always attend 
meetings due to time constraints” 
 
“Umgeni Water is limited in what they sample … monitoring is only done during working 
hours and you don’t know what they [industries in the WIA] have discharged.” 
 
“In part, more resources must be thrown at the problem, in order to empower the community 
[and to] do better monitoring and follow-up on sewer problems, industrial pollution (including 
the legal apparatus) …” 
 
“You highlight the problems but the senior management doesn’t buy in … people have other 
priorities.” 
 
“ … [some] people … expect the municipality to drive the whole process, which has never 
succeeded … The ones that have succeeded have been chaired by the community… and 
the municipality is just a member” 
 
Socio-cultural 
• lack of recognition of responsibility 
Economic 
• investment of capital for upgrades 
Situational 
• meeting logistics (time/place) 
• lack of progress 
• no threat of enforcement 




Despite the fact that participatory governance is entrenched in South African legislation from 
the Constitution onward, regulatory agency and parastatal representatives had not had any 
experience with devolving authority to multi-stakeholder fora; it was thus difficult to judge 
whether this ceding of power would act as a barrier, as postulated by Involve (2005) and 
Servaes and Arnst (1999). It may well be an issue, though, as apparently even coordination 
within and among regulatory agencies and parastatals themselves is not perfect. According 
to these respondents: 
 
“There’s a lack of internal communication about new programmes, they’re not always at our 
fingertips.” 
  
“In Pietermaritzburg, [we] need better cooperation between the municipality and Umgeni 
Water”.  
 
This is especially problematic because as one respondent pointed out, Umgeni Water does 
the bulk of the water quality monitoring on local water courses, but does not have a legal 
mandate to carry out any enforcement. In addition, regulatory agencies and parastatals are 
concerned about being held liable for defamation, especially if data collection procedures are 
contested. One respondent noted that the Pietermaritzburg air quality forum had looked into 
publishing data that “would allow people to read between the lines”, but monitoring 
standards were not determined to be high enough for complete confidence. Past 
unsuccessful attempts at prosecution have also created a reluctance on the part of 
regulatory agencies to try this route again, reinforcing the findings of Pole (2002) discussed 
in the preceding section. In addition, some staff members have been subjected to physical 
intimidation, an obvious barrier to involvement. According to these respondents: 
 
“Information disclosure is not effective for industries … If you tell retailers or consumers 
about the situation with a supplier, you get slapped with a libel case.” 
 
“A colleague disclosed information to a retailer [about a supplier], and had a legal threat 
made against him.” 
 
“… the industries are very hostile to us [agency staff] … It’s quite a volatile environment, and 
the threat is that it becomes personal.” 
 
In such cases, agencies could decide to publicise the results for those companies which are 
in compliance, rather than ‘naming and shaming’ the polluters, and allow the public to draw 
the logical conclusions (Dent, 2008). One respondent suggested that “enforceable legislation 
that has been tried and tested” would also help. Another respondent noted that information 
disclosure can be effective in getting governments to address their own pollution problems, 
but high-profile media attention does not seem to have brought enough pressure to bear to 




respondent (who was not a municipal employee) noted that “sewage is being addressed … 
the municipality has a plan”.  Figure 4.3 summarises the barriers, which combine elements 










Figure 4.3: Economic, situational and socio-cultural barriers facing regulatory agencies and 
parastatals. 
 
In general, economic and situational barriers, particularly a lack of resources for outreach 
and effective monitoring, and were the most significant barriers faced by regulatory agencies 
and parastatals. Developmental barriers did not appear to play a role, but some factors 
combined both situational and socio-cultural elements, in terms of inter- and intra-agency 
coordination and an aversion to methods such as data disclosure and prosecution of 
offenders. 
 
4.5 Incentives to Participate 
As was the case with barriers to participation, economic incentives were important to all 
stakeholders. Situational incentives were related less to logistics than to a desire to see an 
improvement in the future, especially among local residents and NGOs, as well as regulatory 
agencies and parastatals. Developmental factors were largely limited to local residents 
wishing to learn new knowledge and skills. Socio-cultural incentives played a significant role 
among local residents, regulatory agencies and parastatals, but the findings for industry 
were mixed. 
 
The differences in motivation among groups were stark. While industry was largely 
motivated by external factors, such as the requirements of corporate customers or publicity, 
other stakeholders wished to see recovery of the stream. The contrast, especially between 
local residents who rely on the Baynespruit, and industry who only use it for disposal, was 
made apparent by one resident who stated simply, “I need it to be clean”. Another local 
resident expressed their sentiments thus: 
Socio-cultural 
• poor coordination 
• past experience creating reluctance 
to litigate or release info 
 
Situational 
• lack of progress 
Economic 
 





“I think [multi-stakeholder participation] is our last hope. It was in my mind before that the law 
has tried its best and failed … we’ve got to try and form the structures that will include the 
factories, so that we understand each other … I hope that the solution is possible [with] 
everyone around the table.” 
 
Common ground was found among respondents from all stakeholder groups who would be 
encouraged to participate by an initiative that goes beyond meetings to actually accomplish 
something. The following comments were representative: 
 
“If the results of a programme are tangible, that would encourage us.” 
 
“If a group is doing something concrete and positive, with real action and progress, then it’s 
worth getting involved in.” 
 
 
4.5.1 Local Residents and NGOs 
It was theorised that for local residents and NGO members, socio-cultural incentives would 
be of greatest importance, followed by developmental and situational factors. However, 
economic incentives proved to be significant. Prestby et al. (1990: 146) wrote that incentives 
may take “the form of supplies, education, skills, and social recognition”, thereby including 
material goods, but not payment as hoped for by a majority of residents in Sobantu. While 
this discrepancy may be attributed to the fact that much of the literature focussed on citizens 
in developed countries, other reasons, as discussed with respect to barriers in section 4.4.1, 
are unique to South Africa. However, Renn et al. (1993) documented the case of citizens 
who sat on government panels established in the then-West Germany during the 1970s: 
those who were not formally employed were paid a fee for their time. The following 
comments were typical of local residents’ thoughts on financial or material reward: 
 
“I think it could open doors … and assist my community with employment … Creating 
employment is important.” 
 
“ … maybe when there are special jobs like testing the water, if they can just employ … 
people … like us. If there’s an opportunity for a temporary income [it would make it easier for 
me to participate].” 
 
“Usually when we have environmental activities, we ask for T-shirts or water bottle 
sponsorship …” 
 
For residents of Sobantu, it was anticipated that logistical incentives may come in the form of 
English-isiZulu translation at meetings, accessible and neutral meeting locations, or the 
provision of transport and child-care, as suggested by Involve (2005) and Warner (2006). 
Indeed, transport and local venues were mentioned by more than one respondent, but a 
more important situational incentive was the opportunity to contribute to change and assist 




residents, this is not just about personal satisfaction, but can be critical to their future well-
being. “Poor people are by definition asset-poor, and are therefore highly dependent on 
public or common resources” (Egger & Majeres, 1992: 320), such as the Baynespruit. This 
was highlighted by the following representative comments: 
 
“I don’t like what they’re doing [polluting the stream], and one day my grandchildren will go 
there.” 
 
“I would participate because it affects me … if I can get the chance to [help clean up the 
stream] and make it possible, I’ll be there.” 
 
“ … that stream is supposed to provide a living income for me and others.” 
 
Developmental incentives were also mentioned by a majority of local residents, with 
representative statements included below. While some hoped they would have the chance to 
learn knowledge and skills as discussed by Irvin and Stansbury (2004) and Prestby et al. 
(1990), one respondent envisioned contributing personal expertise and experience, as noted 
by Involve (2005) and Negra (1998). The same respondent pointed out the benefits of 
participatory learning: 
  
“I want to be informed.” 
 
“I would want to gain skills, learn more about environmental issues … [this could] help us to 
educate our community and our children.” 
 
“I believe I have knowledge and coordination skills, so those can be my contributions.” 
 
“When I was still young, when we started the environmental club … we used to do some 
water testing in the river. I obtained some skills, and those assisted me in developing my 
understanding [and] getting to where I am today.” 
 
The most important incentives, mentioned by all respondents, were socio-cultural. Chief 
among them was the opportunity to communicate and forge links with other stakeholders, or 
at the very least to have their voices heard. Though in the short-term the participatory 
process may not lead to the agreement of ‘mutual responsibilities’ among stakeholders as 
envisioned by Egger and Majeres (1992), it can at least help marginalised residents to 
develop their network of contacts. The expectation that nothing will change is an obvious 
disincentive for all those who wish to see improvements in the condition of the Baynespruit, 
especially local residents and NGOs. On the other hand, the feeling that they have the 
power to make a difference could be a strong incentive; stakeholders may require resources 
such as accessible information and the ability to network at the regional and national levels 
in order to achieve this. As one respondent put it, “We need people with power on our side”. 




to go and who to ask” for information (Negra, 1998: 30) is critical to effective participation. In 
her survey of local Conservation Commissions in the American states of Vermont and New 
Hampshire, Negra (1998) found that members relied on each other, civil servants, and their 
own and other members’ professional contacts when they needed additional information. 
Developing these contacts can be a real incentive and an ongoing benefit. As the final 
comment in the following selection of respondents’ thoughts shows, local residents and 
NGOs are indeed making use of some such networks. 
 
“A multi-stakeholder forum is a place where the community can represent themselves … we 
can generate ideas on how to solve our problems together.” 
 
“If people are made aware of the community around the river, they’ll think twice about 
polluting.” 
 
“Now, everybody is aware of the pollution, everybody is prepared to take actions to restore 
the river, that’s encouraging me a lot. I can see the solutions can be found.” 
 
They [community members] report discharges to me, and I work with … Umgeni Water 
[to] … follow-up. 
 
For local residents and NGO members, incentives to participate were similar in their 
distribution to barriers, as represented by Figure 4.4. Economic, situational, developmental 











Figure 4.4: Economic, situational, developmental and socio-cultural incentives for local 
residents and NGO members. 
 
4.5.2 Industry 
It was anticipated that some industry incentives would involve situational and socio-cultural 
elements, but that the majority would be primarily economic. In actual fact, companies 
seemed to differ widely in their approach to community issues. For example, while some 
industry representatives held discussions with employees or got feedback through their 
Socio-cultural 
• opportunity to communicate 
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• chance to develop contacts 
vulnerability 
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• employment or material goods 
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• opportunity to improve 
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• gain new  knowledge / skills 




union, one respondent said that their main source of information about the community was 
the local newspaper, and another did not make any effort to keep abreast of area issues at 
all. Companies that employed residents of Sobantu appeared to have situational incentives 
in terms of both their employees’ health and the company’s reputation in the staff’s eyes. 
The following comments demonstrate both sides of the equation: 
 
“The staff are very sensitive, they don’t like it when the company is denigrated [due to bad 
publicity].” 
 
“We have a number of employees who live in the area, so a positive outcome [reducing 
pollution in the Baynespruit] would appeal to me.” 
 
“None of our employees are affected [because they don’t live in Sobantu] … if they were we 
might have been more aware and proactive.” 
 
One of the keys to enhancing this situational incentive is to make clear the benefits of being 
located next to a healthy riparian ecosystem, which many companies would consider an 
asset. As one municipal employee noted: 
 
“ … there seems to be an unfortunate approach by industry to regard it as a resource for 
disposal of refuse and waste. There’s no ownership of the watercourse, they don’t make use 
of it as a potential resource to improve the environment for themselves and their workers.” 
 
Finally, in the reverse of the disincentive posed by participatory processes that did not make 
progress toward their objectives, some industry representatives noted that accomplishments 
act as an incentive. For example: 
 
“Enthusiasm from everybody else … an indication that it’s going to be a successful venture, 
that it’s not going to fall by the wayside [would encourage us to participate].” 
 
The motivation for and nature of a company’s participation is also important. Some industries 
may want to participate to make their good record known, such as one WIA company that 
responded positively to the idea of sharing data within a forum, saying “we strive for 
transparency“. However, other firms may want to participate to keep the status quo, and may 
actually work against transparency and other key aspects of a proactive participatory 
process (Dent, 2008). As discussed by Bansal and Roth (2000), such firms may be 
motivated by the threat of bad publicity, which can become an economic incentive. At a 
meeting of the MCMF, one consultant to the water sector responded to poor water quality 
data about the Baynespruit by suggesting that as legal methods had not worked “what we 
really need is some toyi-toyi-ing outside the factories”. However, good publicity can be an 
equally effective motivator (Triana & Ortolano, 2005), especially for companies that are 




litter removal along the section of the Baynespruit it borders. The following comments, 
illustrate the role of publicity: 
 
“Publicity is a factor, that the company is acknowledged [would make participation more 
attractive to us].” 
 
“My role was to ensure that my company wasn’t part of the problem ... They [customers] 
want you to be compliant, they don’t want to read in the newspaper that they’re associated 
with a polluter.” 
 
This last comment highlights the significance of pressure from corporate customers and 
consumers, which proved to be an important economic incentive for most industries in the 
WIA. In fact, one agency representative felt that such economic incentives were more 
effective than public pressure. Only one respondent mentioned their company having 
realised an economic benefit from changing their processes, in this case salvaging and re-
using material, as discussed by Lober (1998) and Wheeler (1999). Many of the industry 
representatives interviewed made reference to their “responsibility” as a company, though; 
this was often in reference to standards such as ISO 14000 certification (which two 
companies held and a third was working toward), the chemical industry’s international 
Responsible Care initiative, and the Department of Trade and Industry’s code of good 
practice which is part of the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) 
programme. Respondents explained how this motivated their companies: 
 
“International suppliers normally look for ISO standards  … which include air emissions, 
effluent, percent recycling ...” 
 
“Some customers request our ISO 14000 certification annually …The majority of our 
customers … have very high standards, they come and inspect us themselves and do an 
audit.” 
 
“[We get pressure] through BBBEE status … Part of the BBBEE process is a social 
component, so at the moment we’re quantifying what we should be doing in terms of social 
responsibility … It would include environmental issues.” 
 
“A few years ago, a major supermarket group sent letters to all the industries asking us to 
[prove that we] comply [with our trade effluent permit].” 
 
While the companies surveyed did not seem motivated by competitiveness, or “actively 
[innovating] ecologically benign processes and products to enhance their market positions” 
as described by Bansal and Roth (2000: 724), they did aim to comply with corporate 
customers’ requirements in order to maintain their market share, as found by a number of 
authors, such as Acutt (2003) and Buysse and Verbeke (2003). Interestingly, one of the 
edible oil companies claimed that they experienced no pressure from customers; the same 




perhaps indicative of the firm’s corporate culture. As an incentive, CR is often more socio-
cultural in nature than economic, though it may bring financial rewards based on good 
publicity. As Bansal and Roth (2000: 728) note, firms “looking to do the ‘right thing’” are often 
led by an “individual who … champion[s]” the cause. Currently, industries in the WIA who 
practise CR seem to focus on social causes rather than environmental initiatives, and one 
respondent stated that they would have to move resources away from other projects in order 
to fund new projects. However, there does seem to be potential to use CR as an incentive. 
The following comments provide a picture of the existing situation: 
 
“We support a lot of community projects in Sobantu and Eastwood, we sponsor kids for 
schooling, etc. … so we do care what happens.” 
 
“We’re quite involved … we sponsor food gardens, do charity - though it’s more social than 
environmental.” 
 
“Our corporate social responsibility projects include looking after AIDS orphans, adult literacy 
programmes, entrepreneurial training and mentorship. We have not have been involved in 
environmental programmes – probably because no one ever asked.” 
 
“We’re looking for projects in the community in which we can get involved.”  
 
As shown in Figure 4.5, incentives for industry were similar to barriers, with some combining 











Figure 4.5: Economic, situational and socio-cultural incentives for industry. 
 
On the whole, economic incentives were indeed the most important factor for industries. 
Situational incentives also played a role, while socio-cultural incentives were significant for 
some but not others. Developmental incentives did not appear to be important, but were 
difficult to assess. 
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4.5.3 Regulatory Agencies and Parastatals 
For regulatory agencies and parastatals, it was expected that economic, situational, 
developmental and even to some degree socio-cultural incentives would affect participation. 
While the literature predicted that the major economic incentive to a collaborative approach 
would be derived from the reduction in costs associated with enforcement and litigation, this 
did not appear to be the case in the Baynespruit. Rather, respondents saw opportunities for 
increased effectiveness, and possibly cost savings, via the assistance that citizens and 
NGOs could provide through monitoring activities. This difference is perhaps not only a 
consequence of the current lack of prosecution, but also of the lack of resources mentioned 
by all regulatory agency and parastatal respondents, and further discussed in section 4.4.3. 
Comments included the following: 
 
 “ … identifying drains, clearing paths, [etc., would] give people the means to observe and 
get information to the relevant authorities.” 
 
“[Pollution plume travel] time is about three hours from the plants [industries in the WIA] to 
Darvill [sewage treatment plant] … they [community members] are on site and would know 
sooner [if a discharge was made to both sewer and stormwater systems].” 
 
“DUCT has been very proactive in assisting us with lobbying …[and] they’re often my eyes 
and ears in terms of inspection.” 
 
“They [community organisations] help us focus on key areas …  We can spend limited 
resources in a concentrated and focussed way, and achieve some success.” 
 
Nonetheless, regulatory agencies and parastatals had attempted cooperation with industry, 
as noted by the following responses, and hoped to be able to avoid remediation costs by 
reducing pollution in the first place: 
 
“We try not to browbeat with legislation, we try to look at how it’s going to benefit the 
company [to make improvements] … we have to find that balance.” 
 
“ … we’ve helped industries with purification or wastewater treatment problems … We 
encourage waste minimisation and clean-up procedures … [we] ran a workshop with the 
university on techniques. It’s a win-win-win for the municipality, Umgeni Water and the 
community [taxpayers], because it costs less [than] to clean up [a spill or a discharge of 
effluent].” 
 
While it does not appear that any regulatory agencies have tried full public disclosure of 
environmental performance information as described by authors such as Khanna (2001), 
Wang et al. (2004) and Wheeler (1999), some are partnering with NGOs and customers to 
increase the political and economic pressure on polluters, as evidenced by the following 
comments. Unfortunately, this strategy may not be reaching all audiences: one respondent 




data were publicly available, likely because it is either accessed online or circulated digitally 
to interested parties. 
 
“DUCT brings that information [Umgeni Water’s water quality monitoring data] to the Local 
Agenda 21 environmental forum … this is raising the profile of water quality in the city.” 
 
“Clearly, the voice of an organised group representing a sector of the community is much 
stronger than an individual’s. Councillors and others will sit up and take notice.” 
 
“[Umgeni Water] requested that the retailers obtain a certificate from the supplier saying that 
they [industrial producers in the WIA] are compliant, [and] this has worked.” 
 
Another situational incentive found among all respondents but not mentioned in the literature 
was intrinsic motivation. Regulatory agency and parastatal staff were motivated to improve 
conditions through participation either through personal conviction or dedication to their jobs, 
as demonstrated by these representative comments: 
 
“ …these impacts are very serious and something needs to be done. We all need to play our 
part.” 
 
“As an environmentalist, I would like to see the discharges stopped.” 
 
“I want a solution to this … it’s part of my job …  to reduce E. coli and ensure industry is 
compliant. Therefore I have to make all reasonable efforts.” 
 
Representatives from regulatory agencies and parastatals did not seem concerned about the 
transparency which would likely be required, and showed no reticence to engage other 
stakeholders. In fact, one subject from Msunduzi Municipality and another from Umgeni 
Water referred to a multi-stakeholder forum as a chance to present their data and 
information. While they undoubtedly have economic and situational components, the support 
garnered for decisions taken collaboratively – as discussed by Appelstrand (2002), Carnes 
et al. (1998) and Irvin and Stansbury (2004) – is also partly a socio-cultural incentive. 
Respondents clearly felt that a participatory process would result in increased effectiveness: 
 
“If they have specific targets and goals with clear objectives, these help us focus on where 
the community has identified specific problems and you know you’ve got community buy-
in … they’re focussed, energised [and] organised.” 
 
“… clearly dialogue is important, but you have to be advising [industry] on obligations in 
terms of legislation and coming up with plans that are acceptable to everyone.” 
 
“What would encourage me is having the backing from Sobantu … and having the industries 
there.” 
 














Figure 4.6: Economic, situational and socio-cultural incentives for regulatory agencies and 
parastatals. 
As anticipated, mixed economic and situational incentives were important for regulatory 
agencies and parastatals, mostly due to the opportunities for increased effectiveness that 
collaboration could offer. Purely situational incentives, using limited information disclosure to 
attract public and political pressure, and a desire for improvement also played roles, as did 




In this chapter, the history of pollution affecting the Baynespruit was outlined, and some of 
the past initiatives to address the issue were explored. Stakeholders’ views of the existing 
problems and potential solutions, as well as the barriers and incentives to participation they 
face, were then examined. Some of the findings of this study conformed to expectations 
based on recent literature, while others did not, often due to circumstances specific to the 
case. In certain instances it was not possible to judge the existence or impact of an expected 
barrier or incentive. The central ideas described in this chapter are further explored in 
Chapter 5. Conclusions are drawn from the research, and recommendations are made. 
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Chapter 5:  Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The overall objective of this study was to determine how non-regulatory barriers and 
incentives can influence stakeholder participation in reducing water pollution in 
Pietermaritzburg’s Baynespruit. To answer the research question, the key findings presented 
in the previous chapter are highlighted, the significance of these results is explored, and the 
actual outcomes are contrasted with expectations based on the literature. A number of 
conclusions are drawn with respect to the potential of non-regulatory barriers and incentives 
to induce or prevent successful multi-stakeholder participation in reducing water pollution in 
the Baynespruit, and recommendations are made for each of the stakeholders groups. In 
addition, changes that would have improved the methodology are recognised, and areas for 
possible future research are suggested. 
 
5.2 Summary of Key Findings 
This study had a number of objectives: to analyse past initiatives that have tried to address 
pollution in the Baynespruit; to understand stakeholders’ views of the problem in terms of the 
major pollution issues, their effects, and perceived importance; and to identify barriers and 
incentives to participation in a multi-stakeholder forum, including economic, situational, 
developmental and socio-cultural factors. In Chapter 4, the results of the research were 
analysed and discussed. In the following sections, the major findings are summarised and 
their significance is explored. 
 
5.2.1 History of Pollution and Remediation Efforts in the Baynespruit 
Industrial effluent pollution, sewage contamination and the indiscriminate dumping of 
garbage has been degrading water quality in the Baynespruit for two decades. The edible oil 
companies in particular have a long history of intervention from authorities, both Msunduzi 
Municipality and the DWAF, with regard to illegal effluent discharges, but litigation has been 
largely ineffective. The DWAF has also taken Msunduzi Municipality to task over its failure to 
resolve widespread sewage contamination in local water courses, but again little has 
changed. Beginning in the early 1990s, sewage pollution in Pietermaritzburg’s rivers and 
streams was being recognised as an issue requiring urgent attention. Though this appears to 
have resulted in some environmental education in schools, wider consultative endeavours 
apparently did not come to fruition. However this cannot be stated with certainty, as key 





The severe pollution affecting the Baynespruit was apparently first highlighted when students 
and community members from Sobantu marched to City Hall in 2001 to witness SEDN96 
present their grievances to the mayor and the PCCI. Shortly after this march and a further 
appeal to the MCMF, the Baynespruit Task Team (BTT) was established, including 
representation from regulatory agencies, industries in the WIA, and the community. This 
initiative had some temporary success in putting a stop to discharges of industrial effluent in 
the stream, but the pollution resumed once the BTT became inactive. One-time initiatives 
such as the 2001 Baynespruit Clean-up Campaign, while involving a number of stakeholders 
and raising awareness, have apparently not contributed to long-term solutions. One of the 
main problems hindering long-term progress in all these endeavours appears to have been a 
lack of ongoing communication and involvement among stakeholders, particularly local 
residents who were not kept ‘in the loop’ by the municipal officials and NGOs working with 
them. Without feedback, they would have been unable to maintain public and political 
pressure on the issue; it is also possible that there was fragmentation within the community’s 
own activist networks. The BTT, which most resembled a multi-stakeholder forum, 
nonetheless fell short of being a participatory process due to a lack of redistribution of power 
which would have allowed local residents to wield some influence over decision-making. On 
a positive note, the increased monitoring activities undertaken by the regulatory agencies 
and parastatals after the formation of the BTT highlight its effectiveness as an incentive for 
industrial pollution reduction. 
 
Having examined the record of pollution and remediation efforts in the Baynespruit, it is 
possible to see how this history contributes to the current situation. It is clear that litigation, 
or even the threat thereof, has become an ineffectual deterrent against not only industrial 
polluters but the municipality, with its woeful record on sewage. However, monitoring and 
increased attention seem to have worked well in reducing industrial discharges, at least 
temporarily. In addition, there has been a significant loss of institutional memory among 
government, private and civil society organisations working in the field of water issues. 
Finally, if the past is any indication, it will largely be up to citizens and NGOs, perhaps with 
some assistance from supportive agency staff members, to take the lead in raising 
awareness, initiating action, and sustaining attention on the issues. Local residents may well 
require mentoring to be able to reach the necessary level of organisation and empowerment, 
as well as support for their continuing efforts, given the many disappointments they have 





5.2.2 Stakeholders’ Views of the Problem 
There was general consensus among stakeholders that industrial pollution was a major 
problem, and most also pointed to garbage as an issue; in addition, regulatory agency and 
parastatal staff, as well as local residents and NGOs, felt that sewage contamination was a 
primary concern. All stakeholders raised the impact of pollution on human health as the 
greatest concern. Local residents in particular also worried about recreation and food 
security issues, while regulatory agency and parastatal staff tended to take a broader view of 
the causes of pollution and its effects on human and natural systems. Industry respondents 
did not seem to have an understanding of the importance of healthy riparian ecosystems as 
a foundation for human needs. There was a definite gradient among the stakeholder groups 
in terms of their level of concern: local residents were keenly aware of the loss to the 
community of what used to be an important resource, with the livelihoods of farmers under 
particular threat; regulatory agency and parastatal staff felt a commitment to working toward 
an improvement in the condition of the Baynespruit as part of their jobs; and most industry 
stakeholders felt little custodianship, despite their use of the stream for disposal of 
stormwater. 
 
Local residents, frustrated by years of campaigns, media coverage, and legal action which 
have all failed to solve pollution problems, seemed willing to engage in a multi-stakeholder 
participatory process with industries, government and other interested parties. Industry 
respondents put a surprising amount of faith in companies in the WIA acting responsibly, 
given that it does not appear to have worked in the past, while also noting that monitoring 
and enforcement were key to reducing pollution – and placing this responsibility entirely on 
the authorities. Along with regulatory agency and parastatal staff, they felt that education 
was key to addressing the issues with local residents. Agency respondents observed that 
they would need more resources to carry out activities such as awareness-raising, capacity-
building, better monitoring, prosecution and the replacement or repair of infrastructure in 
order to address the main solid and liquid pollution problems. 
 
Gaining an appreciation of stakeholders’ mental models of the Baynespruit, the pollution 
affecting it and the impacts of the current state of affairs contributed greatly to the 
understanding of possible approaches to reducing pollution. There are evidently barriers to 
be overcome among many industries, not only with regard to becoming informed about the 
pollution problems and taking responsibility for the stream (rather than just their individual 
stormwater outfalls), but understanding at a more basic level how healthy ecosystems 
underpin healthy human systems. On the other hand, agency staff members perceive 




perhaps restricting their understanding of the problems and potential solutions by not taking 
a wider view (beyond their community and immediately adjacent areas). All stakeholders 
would thus benefit from a more holistic understanding of the causes and impacts of pollution, 
as well as from considering the Baynespruit and indeed the uMsunduzi catchment as part of 
larger water systems, in order to identify the options available and the leverage points for 
effective intervention to bring about change. 
 
5.2.3 Barriers to Participation 
For the majority of stakeholders in all groups, economic barriers were significant in 
preventing them from working toward a reduction in pollution. For local residents, financial 
barriers included lack of funds for transport and supplies, as well as an expectation of reward 
for volunteer work. For the NGO representative, the main problem was lack of staff time, 
which, along with equipment, was also a barrier to regulatory agencies and parastatals; 
some respondents in the latter group also mentioned a lack of support from management. 
For industries, evidence from other respondents indicated that pollution reduction was often 
too costly to warrant the required expenditure. The costs of pollution must therefore be 
raised to ensure full cost accounting, for example through the instituting of a tradable permit 
system. 
 
When it came to situational barriers, there was general agreement among stakeholders that 
a participatory process which was not proactive and cooperative, or was not making 
progress, would discourage participation. In addition, logistics such as the timing and 
location of meetings were issues raised by a number of respondents across all stakeholder 
groups. Given its constitutional and legislative basis in South Africa, regulatory agency and 
parastatal staff members had surprisingly little experience with cooperative governance. 
Poor cooperation among agencies, coupled with a lack of confidence in data collection and 
unsuccessful attempts at litigation have all created mixed situational and socio-cultural 
barriers to government and parastatals effectiveness. Both local residents and some industry 
representatives criticised the lack of monitoring and enforcement by authorities, but, with the 
exception of the NGO representative, they seemed unable to see how they could take action 
themselves to transcend this barrier. While representatives from industry responded 
positively to the idea of a multi-stakeholder forum, very few actually attended the 
Baynespruit Conservancy’s first meeting, perhaps due to their low prioritisation of the issue, 
or a desire to avoid taking responsibility for current conditions or for making future 
commitments. Another barrier to polluters was the removal of potential motivating factors for 
change, such as the ongoing lack of enforcement by regulatory agencies, or even corruption, 




Developmental barriers, in the form of a lack of skills and knowledge, were apparently 
restricted to local residents. Socio-cultural barriers were also greatest among local residents. 
A lack of empowerment, combined with learned dependency, was a major factor, though 
cultural elements also seemed to come into play. Residents either were not fully cognizant of 
the options available to them to bring pressure to bear, or were not taking full advantage of 
them. This was also a problem to some extent for regulatory agencies and parastatals, who 
could take a more creative approach to information disclosure, for example by recognising 
those companies that are in compliance and allowing the logical conclusions to be drawn 
about other firms. 
 
Particularly for local residents, it gradually became clear that building contacts, networks and 
partnerships was key to overcoming many of the barriers they faced. Being ‘connected’ can 
bring, for example, knowledge of and access to funding sources, education and training 
resources (especially those not provided by government), as well as opportunities to build 
advocacy skills and become informed about the many strategies to raise awareness and 
bring pressure to bear. Unfortunately, residents seemed to be waiting for another 
stakeholder to lead this process, and it is hoped that a partnership with the DUCT will help 
them overcome many of the barriers they currently face. If citizens are unimpeded in taking 
action, this could in turn bring about the removal of some of the ‘artificial’ barriers holding 
other stakeholders back – particularly those in industry, but also in regulatory agencies and 
parastatals – and preventing what would otherwise be powerful incentives to reduce 
pollution from being effective. 
 
5.2.4 Incentives to Participate 
As with barriers to participation in pollution reduction, economic incentives played a role for 
all stakeholder groups. For local residents, this incentive took the form of employment or 
material goods. Situational elements came into play for regulatory agency and parastatal 
staff, for whom incentives consisted mainly of either citizen assistance with monitoring, or 
avoidance of remediation costs by cooperating with industry to reduce pollution. For most 
industry respondents, economic incentives were very important, with companies primarily 
motivated by corporate customers’ requirements or achieving certification standards set by 
industry or government, such as ISO 14000 or BBBEE status. Publicity, either positive or 
negative, was also noted as a factor which could act as an economic incentive. 
 
Reflecting what was found in terms of barriers, the majority of stakeholders would be 
encouraged to participate in a multi-stakeholder process that was achieving real progress 




was the opportunity to contribute to bettering the community’s – and their own – well-being. 
Interestingly, regulatory agency and parastatal staff also felt personally motivated to improve 
the situation, and were generally eager to share information if this could assist the process. 
Situational incentives for industry included employees’ health (for those who live 
downstream) and general morale, though the importance of this incentive varied 
substantially among respondents. 
 
As was the case with barriers, developmental incentives were apparently limited to local 
residents who wished to learn or contribute knowledge and skills. The most important 
incentives for this stakeholder group, though, were socio-cultural. Chief among them was the 
chance to communicate with other stakeholders, and potentially generate solutions together. 
However, an important secondary incentive, whose potential residents do not seem to have 
fully recognised, is the opportunity to make contacts, gain access to information and meet 
well-connected or influential individuals. For industry, a potential socio-cultural incentive to 
participate would be an appeal to those companies who practice CR, though at the moment 
their focus is more social than environmental. 
 
Some incentives were evidently not playing as strong a role as they could have been. For 
example, the fact that regulatory agencies have largely abdicated their enforcement duties 
meant that avoiding the costs of prosecution was no longer an incentive. While all 
respondents described the role of situational incentives, the dearth of actual industry 
participation when the opportunity arose indicates that improving the current situation is in 
fact not a priority for them. However, a number of incentives were nonetheless identified 
among stakeholders in each category, and, along with the removal of artificial barriers, it 
should be possible to translate these incentives into progress. 
 
5.3 Conclusions 
Prior to beginning the research, it was predicted that each category of barriers and 
incentives (economic, situational, developmental and socio-cultural) would be of differing 
importance depending on the stakeholder group (local residents and NGOs, industry, 
regulatory agencies and parastatals). The literature review informed the original 
conceptualisation, presented in Chapter 3. While in many cases the predicted barriers and 
incentives were indeed present, the importance of a number of the categories deviated from 
what was expected for each stakeholder group, as shown in Figure 5.1. The width of each 

















Figure 5.1: Comparison of the relative importance of economic, situational, developmental 
and socio-cultural barriers and incentives. 
 
Based on the research conducted as part of this study, including both the review of relevant 
literature and the data collected from semi-structured interviews and other sources, it must 
be concluded that non-regulatory barriers and incentives do indeed have the potential to 
influence multi-stakeholder participation in reducing water pollution in the Baynespruit. 
However, as outlined in the preceding sections, a number of changes must be made for the 
incentives to be maximised and for stakeholders to be able to transcend the barriers they 
face and engage each other in the future. Increasing the influence of incentives and reducing 
the strength of barriers could include strategies such as making use of the ability of 
monitoring and public pressure to stimulate industrial and municipal action, as well as 
exploiting the potential for better coordination and more effective leveraging of power, 
especially on the part of community members. In addition, though developmental barriers 
and incentives appeared to play a role only for local residents, all stakeholders would benefit 
from greater information and awareness, something that should take place naturally as part 
of the participatory learning process. This should allow all parties to begin thinking beyond 
their immediate interests; some stakeholders will have farther to go in broadening their 
viewpoints than others. 
 
Active participation by all stakeholders does not by itself guarantee the success of a given 
participatory process. Factors such as leadership and facilitation, the decision-making 
process (majority, consensus, etc.), stakeholder continuity, and funding support all play 
important roles in determining success or failure (Griffin, 1999; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). 
Creating what Prestby et al. (1990: 144) called an ‘empowering organization’, which can 
“provide opportunities for individual participants to develop skills, gain control, and identify 
with others” in order to achieve the goal of pollution reduction will undoubtedly require time, 

































resources and effort. At the moment there is a decided lack of vision, much less a shared 
sense of purpose, surrounding the future of the Baynespruit: local residents picture a return 
to the past, regulatory agencies and parastatals want something done to clean things up, 
and industry seems to consider improved social conditions such as housing and service 
provision as the answer. However, two local residents summed up the possibilities: 
 
“For a long time, even in a democracy, we’ve talked about community participation, but we’re 
not practising it. A multi-stakeholder forum is a place where the community can represent 
themselves …  we [all stakeholders] can generate ideas on how to solve our problems 
together.” 
 
“ … all the stakeholders must understand each other’s problems. For example, why are the 
factories polluting? From our side, we need to tell them how people are suffering 
downstream. From the municipality’s side, they are ignorant of the sewerage blockage and 
the problems it causes for us - swimming, washing clothes ...” 
 
“[By bringing together] the factories, the community, farmers, the municipality, Umgeni Water, 
the DUCT … I think it is possible … to find a lasting solution.” 
 
5.4 Recommendations 
Based on the key findings of the study and the conclusions drawn, a number of 
recommendations may be made. With regard to each stakeholder group, the possibilities 
available to them to work toward the goal of participatory pollution reduction in the 
Baynespruit are highlighted. In addition, changes that would have improved the research 
methodology are made, along with suggestions for further research. 
 
5.4.1 Local Residents and NGOs 
Local residents do not appear to be taking full advantage of the potential public and political 
pressure they could bring to bear by developing their network of contacts. By moving beyond, 
for example, the local Ward Committee or partnerships developed at the municipal level, 
they could gain access to more powerful leverage. Local people living in Papua New 
Guinea’s Tolukuma province, for example, most certainly did not know the administrators of 
a large Norwegian pension fund that held shares in the Australian company operating a gold 
mine in Tolukuma. However, through a satellite office of Oxfam Australia’s mining 
ombudsman, the plight of the people whose river was being polluted by waste from the mine 
was made known to the Norwegians, and shortly after they pulled out, the mine pledged to 
clean up its act (Ferraro, 2008). 
 
Another option that residents could use is CEM. As noted previously, CEM is often 
undertaken for advocacy purposes, and such tactics are already being used in South Africa. 




the Pietermaritzburg-based groundWork, which is involved in the Bucket Brigades 
programme discussed in section 2.2.2. With respect to information release, as Meadows 
(1999: 13) observed, if you can not “get the powers that be to permit it to happen [you can] 
go around them”, or in this case perhaps do it yourself. 
 
5.4.2 Industry 
With a couple of exceptions, the pollution affecting the Baynespruit was not something about 
which industry representatives were well-informed or even particularly concerned. While they 
were not against the idea of a multi-stakeholder participatory process, to date their 
involvement has been limited. This state of affairs is made possible because most 
companies do not see themselves and their stormwater outfalls as part of the larger socio-
economic system of which the Baynespruit is a part. This situation may well change if and 
when the CMA structure is put in place regionally, and all stakeholders are forced to 
consider their use of and impacts on water resources. This framework will also eliminate 
some of the artificial barriers identified in this research, such as the lack of an enforcement 
threat, as discussions and decisions will take place in an open, transparent forum, rather 
than directly between industry and the regulatory agency – what Molle et al. (2008) termed 
the ‘governance black box’. Moreover, this public focus may well result in the increased 
market pressure for pollution abatement measures identified by Afsah et al. (1997), as the 
links between large corporate customers and their poorly-performing suppliers are made 
public. 
 
In the meantime, companies with good records could create goodwill (and likely good 
publicity) by participating alongside fellow stakeholders in working toward pollution reduction. 
Companies that still have effluent discharge problems may benefit from acknowledging them 
sooner rather than later, and getting technical assistance from regulatory agencies and 
parastatals, or undertaking an environmental audit to see where opportunities for costs 
savings lie in re-designing processes. In either case, industries in the WIA should consider 
emulating the “committed dedicated core of industrialists” (Karar & Seetal, 2000: 12) in 
Durban’s Isipingo CMF who, over the course of 20 years of involvement, have not only 
considerably improved their awareness of water quality issues and the effects of pollution on 
human and ecological systems, but actually lead the forum’s work to improve local 
watercourses (Cullis, 2008). 
 
5.4.3 Regulatory Agencies and Parastatals 
Staff at regulatory agencies and parastatals are aware of the causes and effects of the 




adequate monitoring and enforcement, they could form partnerships with civil society, both 
to focus their resources and increase the pressure on management and elected officials to 
address the issues (though this latter strategy is obviously sensitive). More importantly, 
these agencies control the flow of information. The establishment of the Toxic Release 
Inventory in the United States, through which companies’ reported discharges of air 
pollutants were made publicly available, resulted in a 40% reduction in emissions within four 
years; this positive ‘race for the bottom’ was inspired not by any legislative or economic 
inducements, merely by the worst polluters’ desire to present a better image to the 
communities in which they operated (Meadows, 1999). If even this mechanism is not 
possible without the threat of libel, the opposite tactic of releasing positive information – for 
example, on those industries which are in compliance with their trade effluent permits – 
would nonetheless generate public scrutiny. 
 
5.4.4 Improvements to the Methodology 
A number of authors have pointed to the importance of verifying the conclusions drawn as 
part of qualitative research. One of the main shortcomings in this study’s methodology was 
the representativeness of the sample of local residents: all were involved to some degree in 
community activism, and the majority had in fact taken on leadership roles. Thus, their 
thoughts and experiences are unlikely to have been representative of the community as a 
whole. However, they were chosen as respondents due to their ability to provide informative 
answers to questions which less involved residents may not have been able to address. 
Unfortunately, this makes it difficult to generalise the conclusions drawn to other residents of 
Sobantu (Monette et al., 2002). In addition, as all research was conducted by a single 
researcher, the researcher’s cultural background and point of view is likely to have 
influenced the analysis (Yin, 1994). Though it was not possible within the scope of this study, 
having other researchers analyse the data would have bolstered any common conclusions 
reached (Monette et al., 2002). Finally, though internal validity is not a focus for case study 
research (Yin, 1994), Appleton (1995) suggests that a good way of checking whether the 
research findings from interviews are credible is to review them with key subjects; 
unfortunately time constraints did not allow this to occur. 
 
5.4.5 Further Research 
It is very difficult to design a case study which is considered ‘complete’ on its own (Yin, 
1994). Indeed, two recommendations for further research have come to light over the course 
of this study. The first relates to the narrow boundaries within which this research was 
conducted. It would be informative to explore the perspectives, interests, and possible 




Road, primarily in the Northdale and Raisethorpe areas; though the Baynespruit joins the 
uMsunduzi at Sobantu, downstream communities may also be affected. Secondly, due to the 
nature of this study, it was difficult to get a true picture of the barriers and incentives to 
industrial pollution reduction. If selected companies agreed to take part in a more in-depth 
study, such as the one conducted by Bansal and Roth (2000) looking at firms in the U.K. and 
Japan, it would no doubt generate valuable insight. 
 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter outlined how the gathering and analysis of data, complemented by a literature 
review, addressed the original objectives of the research. It described the key findings and 
their significance, and drew conclusions based on these results. It also made 
recommendations for each of the stakeholder groups, as well as for ways to improve the 
methodology and for possible further research. It is hoped that this case study, by identifying 
barriers and incentives to stakeholder participation, will contribute to the effectiveness of the 
newly-formed Baynespruit Conservancy. The Conservancy seeks to unite interested parties 
in reducing solid and liquid pollution in the stream and the attendant negative impacts on 
water quality and ecosystem health. In addition, once the CMA structure is in place 
regionally, local stakeholders will be instrumental in ensuring that water-related information 
and issues are brought to the attention of this forum, and it is hoped that this research will 
contribute to this process. At a broader level, it may be possible to facilitate participation by 
stakeholders in other areas who are experiencing similar situations or operating under 
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Appendix A: Interview Question Guide 
 
Introductory: 
Tell me about the stream running through the Sobantu / Willowton area. 
How long have you lived near / worked near / otherwise used the Baynespruit? 
How is the stream part of your daily life? 
What (if any) value or benefit do you derive from the Baynespruit? 
Are you concerned about in its fate? Why? 
 
Perception of Pollution Problems: 
What are the main problems affecting the Baynespruit? 
Which of these issues are most important to you? 
How do these problems affect you and your community/employees? 
How important are these impacts, for you? 
How can these problems be solved? 
 
Perception of Multi-Stakeholder Participatory Processes: 
In your opinion, who needs to participate in finding solutions to these problems? 
Why would you participate (or not)? 
What role could you play? / How could you contribute? 
What would encourage you to participate? / Why would you want to participate? 
What could prevent you from participating? 
What would make it easier for you to participate? 
Do you think you could influence the decision-making process? 
Have you participated in any past initiatives addressing the pollution in the Baynespruit? 
If so, tell me about it / them. 
What role did you play? 
What did you hope would be accomplished? 
What was actually accomplished? Why? 
Have you met and/ or worked with other Baynespruit stakeholders? How did you build 
relationships? 
How could working with them help solve the Baynespruit’s pollution problems? 
If you had unlimited resources, how would you solve the problem? 





For Residents Only: 
Are you informed about discharges? How do you feel about this? 
What people or resources could assist you in participating and solving problems? 
Do you think the municipality is doing all it can? 
 
For Industry Only: 
How have you faced environmental challenges over the years? 
Do you allocate resources to corporate social responsibility with respect to the environment? 
Do your buyers / customers put pressure on you with respect to environmental compliance? 
How do you keep up with what is going on in the community? 
Would you be willing to contribute data to a multi-stakeholder process? 
 
For Agencies Only: 
Have you tried multi-stakeholder processes? 
What has been your experience with benefits and costs? 
Have you tried working cooperatively with industry? What was your experience? 



















Male 36-55 Duzi-uMngeni Conservation Trust 
Industry 
Female 26-35 
Managers from WIA companies (Anchor 
Chemicals, Belgotex Carpets, Dystar 
Boehme Africa, Springold Investments 










Msunduzi Municipality (managers) 
Male 36-55 
Male 55+ Msunduzi Municipality (elected official) 
Male 36-55 
Umgeni Water (technical / scientific staff) 
Male 36-55 
Female 26-35 DWAF (development staff) 
 
 
